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S U P P L E M E N T F I V E

to

EXTENDED CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS RELATING  
TO DISARMAMENT

16 October 1959 - 31 December 1960

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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

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- 27 Oct 59 The Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference resumed after a 2-month recess. In an opening statement the US renewed its request that Soviet scientists study the latest US data on the difficulty of differentiating between underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes. The USSR again urged Western acceptance of its view that the number of annual inspections was not a matter for technical determination and must be set at a fixed figure by political agreement.  
NYT, 28 Oct 59, p. 15.
- 29 Oct 59 British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd suggested in a speech to the House of Commons that the US, UK, and USSR hold a joint underground nuclear-test series to provide data on which to base an effective control system.  
NYT, 30 Oct 59, pp. 1, 2.
- 3 Nov 59 The USSR announced to the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference its readiness to participate in a new scientific evaluation of the problems of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests. (The West had been urging such an evaluation for the past 10 months; see item of 5 January 1959.)  
The next day the Soviet delegate proposed drastic limitations on any investigation to be carried out. He now proposed that scientists from the two sides should determine only: What the "objective" readings of seismographs and other delicate control instruments should be to qualify "suspicious events" for on-site investigation by mobile inspection teams supervising a test ban. The control system itself would remain that prescribed by the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts (see item of 21 August 1958). (See item of 24 November 1959.)  
NYT, 4 Nov 59, p. 1; ibid., 5 Nov 59, p. 5.
- 4 Nov 59 The French UN delegate announced that France was determined to stage a nuclear test in the Sahara unless the US, UK, and USSR "renounce their nuclear armament."  
(See last two items of 20 November 1959.)  
NYT, 5 Nov 59, p. 1.
- 8 Nov 59 Former President Truman urged in a syndicated article the imperative necessity of resuming US atomic testing with underground detonations. Such testing would not constitute a health hazard, he pointed out, because it produced no fallout. Since underground testing could not be readily detected by existing methods, it was possible that other countries were testing without the knowledge of the US. For the US to refrain from resuming testing under such circumstances, Mr. Truman wrote, was to risk US security and jeopardize world peace.  
NYT, 8 Nov 59, pp. 1, 9.
- 20 Nov 59 The UN General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution transmitting to the UN Disarmament Commission, among other things, the British disarmament proposal of 17 September 1959 (see item) and the Soviet total-disarmament proposal of 18 September 1959 (see item). Further, the resolution requested the UN Secretary General to make available to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee the same documents "for thorough consideration," and called upon governments to "make every effort to achieve a constructive solution" of the disarmament problem. It concluded by expressing the hope that "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective inter-

national control would be worked out and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."

NYT, 21 Nov 59, p. 1; text of resolution in Dept of State Bulletin, XLI (23 Nov 59), 756-767.

20 Nov 59

The UN General Assembly approved an Irish resolution calling upon the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee to consider ways of preventing an increasing number of states from acquiring nuclear weapons, and requesting nations not possessing nuclear weapons to agree not to begin their manufacture. The measure was adopted 70-0, with the nine members of the Soviet bloc abstaining, along with France, China, and Peru.

NYT, 17 Nov 59, p. 5; ibid., 21 Nov 59, pp. 1, 4.

20 Nov 59

The UN General Assembly adopted an Afro-Asian resolution by which the Assembly (1) requested France to refrain from carrying out her projected atomic test in the Sahara Desert; (2) expressed "grave concern" over the intended test; and (3) called attention to the Assembly's own "special responsibility" for the well-being of the dependent peoples of Africa "threatened" by such tests. Jules Moch, the French UN delegation's disarmament expert, pointed out that the resolution was "not binding in international law"; he termed it "totally unacceptable to France," "scientifically incorrect," "politically odious," and "deliberately offensive." (See item of 13 February 1960.)

NYT, 21 Nov 59, pp. 1, 4; ibid., 13 Nov 59, pp. 1, 2

21 Nov 59

The UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions calling on the states engaged in nuclear-test-ban negotiations at Geneva to continue their voluntary suspension of testing. The US voted for one of the two resolutions--one sponsored by Austria, Japan, and Sweden, which passed by a vote of 78-0-2. At the same time the US pointed out that it remained opposed to any permanent cessation of nuclear tests without agreement on a system of international safeguards. The US abstained from voting on the other resolution, which was sponsored by 24 countries led by India and which passed by a vote of 60-1-20 (US). Two days earlier, in Committee I (Political and Security), US Representative Lodge had described the second resolution as "more far-reaching" and as containing "certain language with which we are not in accord." The preamble of the second resolution, after speaking of "the increasing hazards" to mankind resulting from tests of nuclear weapons and of "the profound concern evinced by the peoples of all countries" regarding such tests, emphasized the urgency of reaching a test-cessation agreement under effective international control. By using the words "nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests," both the statement of urgency and the operative portion of the second resolution perhaps implied an expansion of the purpose of the Geneva negotiations, since it differed in this respect from the resolution favored by the US, which spoke only of the effort to reach agreement on prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. The second resolution had an additional clause appealing to States other than the three negotiating at Geneva to desist from nuclear weapons testing.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLI (21 Dec 59), 918-919; NYT, 22 Nov 59, p. 3.

22 Nov 59

John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated on the Meet the Press TV program that he opposed

any extension of the US moratorium on nuclear testing beyond 31 December 1959 except on a week-to-week basis; and each extension of a week, he added, should be conditioned "on the status of the negotiations at Geneva. Mr. McCone made it clear that he was speaking for himself and not the Eisenhower Administration. (See item of 29 December 1959.)

NYT, 23 Nov 59, p. 1.

24 Nov 59

A memorandum issued jointly in Washington by the Chairman of the AEC and the Director of the USSR Main Administration for the Utilization of Atomic Energy described agreements reached for co-operation between the US and USSR in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. (These agreements were within the framework of the 1960-1961 US-USSR Exchange Agreement in the scientific, technical, educational, and cultural fields.) The memorandum announced that the agreements provided for: (1) The exchange of scientists specializing in thermonuclear research, nuclear-power reactors, and high-energy and nuclear physics; (2) the exchange of information on peaceful uses of atomic energy through the exchange of documents, reports, and abstracts with such papers provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency; (3) the separate examination by the US and USSR of the feasibility of engaging in joint projects, with a meeting during the first half of 1960 to consider "what enterprises merit further study"; and (4) consideration of the possibility of making available new scientific instruments under agreed terms and on a reciprocal basis.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLI (28 Dec 59), 958-959;  
NYT, 25 Nov 59, pp. 1, 4.

24 Nov 59

At the nuclear-test-ban conference in Geneva the Soviet Union agreed with the US and the UK on a program for a study of underground nuclear explosions (see item of 3 November 1959). The study was to begin the next day. The first part of the agreed instructions to the scientific experts of the two sides stated that the experts were to "consider the question of the use of objective instrument readings in connection with the selection of an event which cannot be identified by the international control organ and which could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, in order to determine a basis for initiating on-site inspection." The second part of the instructions directed that the experts, "proceeding from the discussions and the conclusions" of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts (see item of 21 August 1958), "consider all data and studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events and . . . consider possible improvements of the techniques and instrumentation." The Soviet Union had wanted to limit the experts' work as closely as possible to the points covered in the first part of the instructions. The teams of experts were to be headed by Dr. James B. Fisk (US), Sir William Penney (UK), and Dr. Yevgeni I Federov (USSR). (See item of 19 December 1959.)

NYT, 25 Nov 59, pp. 1, 4; Dept of State Bulletin, XLI (14 Dec 59), 859.

30 Nov 59

The Geneva nuclear-test-ban conferees agreed on a draft annex to the proposed treaty, providing for a preparatory commission to begin setting up the international control machinery without awaiting formal ratification of the projected treaty. The preparatory commission, which would

consist of representatives of the US, UK, and USSR, would be set up with an executive secretary immediately after the treaty was signed. As soon as possible after ratification of the treaty, the commission would be expanded to include four of the other participating nations. All decisions of the preparatory commission while it consisted of only the Big Three would be unanimous. After expansion to seven members the commission would operate under rules to be laid down in the treaty. The Soviet Union wanted an all-inclusive veto power under these rules, whereas the West had been insisting on a provision specifying the "inherent right" of any treaty member to consider itself free of its obligations if the pact should not be lived up to by all signatories.

The duties of the preparatory commission would include geological and topographical surveys and other necessary studies for locating and equipping the network of control posts for policing the test ban, study of the communications needs of the inspection system, selection of a headquarters site in Vienna, preparations for the requirements of the international staff to man the permanent control organization, the laying of the groundwork for the first full conference of treaty members within six months after ratification by the Big Three, and the drafting of the permanent organization's first budget.

NYT, 1 Dec 59, pp. 1,14.

- 1 Dec 59 The US and 11 other nations signed at Washington a treaty guaranteeing nonmilitarization of, and freedom of scientific investigation in, Antarctica. The treaty prohibited any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste on the Antarctic Continent. The treaty was to go into effect upon its ratification by the 12 governments. (See items of 3 May 1958, item of 15 October 1959, and 10 August 1960.)  
Dept of State Bulletin, XLI (21 Dec 59), 911-917;  
NYT, 2 Dec 59, p. 46.
- 1 Dec 59 The NSC (1) noted and discussed an interim report on the US position with respect to the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, Director of the Joint Disarmament Study, and (2) noted that the draft statement of a proposed US long-range goal in arms-control matters, presented at the meeting by Mr. Coolidge, would subsequently be circulated to Council members and advisers so that they might provide the Secretary of State with any comments thereon for further study.  
Mr. Coolidge's draft statement contained the following text:
- The present policy of the United States on arms control matters should be to favor verifiable arms control measures which tend toward establishing world peace under law; namely, a world in which:
1. Rules of international law prohibiting armed conflict between nations should be in effect, backed by adequate jurisdiction in a world court and by an adequate international peace force.
  2. National military establishments shall have been reduced to the point where no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose the international peace force, and no weapons of mass destruction shall be in the control of any nation.
- (TS) NSC Action No 2152, 1 Dec 59 (Approved by President 3 Dec 59); (S) Memo, Exec Secy to NSC, "U.S. Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments," 3 Dec 59, JMF 3050 (3 Dec 59).
- 3 Dec 59 President Eisenhower designated Fredrick M. Eaton as US representative and chairman of the US delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee scheduled to begin its work early in 1960 at Geneva (see items of 10 September and 21 and 28 December 1959). Mr. Eaton was to have the personal rank of ambassador and to act under the direction of the Secretary of State. The White House press release announcing Mr. Eaton's appointment also stated that the US viewed the forthcoming Committee of Ten negotiations as a "major opportunity" to progress toward the goal of safeguarded disarmament.  
Dept of State Bulletin, XLI (21 Dec 59), 902.
- 10 Dec 59 The NSC (1) noted and discussed an oral presentation on major problems associated with control of long-range ballistic missiles, by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky), with particular reference to developments

that might affect the conclusions of the report of 28 March 1958 on the same subject (by Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr.; see item); (2) requested the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology to draw up, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, terms of reference for a study on the monitoring of production and testing of long-range ballistic missiles, and to coordinate the conduct of such a study and the preparation of a report thereon to the President (see items of 4 and 24 March 1960).

(NSC) NSC Action No. 2161, 10 Dec 59 (approved by President 23 Dec 59).

12 Dec 59 The UN established a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, consisting of the US, the UK, France, the USSR, and 20 other nations. (Politically, the committee comprised 7 Communist-bloc nations, 12 Western or pro-Western nations, and 5 neutral nations.) The committee was to study (1) practical and feasible means for giving effect to programs in the peaceful uses of outer space that could be appropriately undertaken under UN auspices, including co-operation in scientific research on outer space, and (2) the nature of legal problems that might arise from the exploration of outer space. The committee was to submit reports on its activities to the General Assembly. (This committee superseded the UN Ad Hoc Committee established on 13 Dec 58; see item.)  
Text of resolution in Dept of State Bulletin, XLI (11 Jan 60), 68-69; NYT, 13 Dec 59, p. 42.

14 Dec 59 The Soviet delegate to the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference offered a compromise package solution to three of the principal problems under negotiation. The Soviets proposed that, if the West would accept a 3-3-1 (3 Communist-bloc members, 3 Western, and 1 neutral) composition for the control commission, the USSR would in turn accept the Western proposals on control-post staffing (one-third host-country nationals, one-third "other side," and one-third nationals of other countries), and on control-commission voting procedures on budgetary and other financial questions (two-thirds vote to carry). The USSR continued to demand, however, that all control-post chiefs be host-country nationals; moreover, as the New York Times pointed out, the Communist bloc with its three representatives out of seven could prevent the two-thirds vote required on budgetary and similar questions.  
NYT, 15 Dec 59, pp. 1, 12.

17 Dec 59 The JCS responded to the invitation of the Secretary of Defense on 8 December 1959 to comment on the draft statement of a proposed long-range disarmament goal presented by Mr. Charles A. Coolidge to the National Security Council on 1 December (see item). The JCS noted that they had not been furnished with information on the nature or scope of the initial steps Mr. Coolidge had mentioned at the NSC meeting as envisioned in his plan for achieving the long-range disarmament goal (see item of 3 December 59). The JCS therefore considered it premature to comment upon the substance of the proposed long-range disarmament goal and recommended that the formulation of a Department of Defense position concerning this goal be delayed until the complete report of the Joint Disarmament Study had been received and analyzed. (See items of 1 January and 8 February 1960.)

(S) JCSM-522-59 to SecDef, "U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments (U)," 17 Dec 59, derived from (S) JCS 1731/324, 14 Dec 59. Both in JMF 3050 (3 Dec 59).

- 17 Dec 59 The North Atlantic Council, having begun its regular semiannual ministerial meeting at Paris on 15 December, reaffirmed its position on disarmament in a communique issued at the close of the first part of this meeting. Among other things the Council reiterated that general and controlled disarmament remained the goal of the West. Every opportunity, it stated, would be taken to make progress in that direction, but until that goal was achieved the alliance could not afford to neglect measures necessary for its security.  
Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (4 Jan 60), 3-4.
- 17 Dec 59 The Atomic Energy Commission detonated two small conventional explosions in a Louisiana salt mine to determine the possibilities of detecting and concealing underground atomic tests. The explosions were designed to test the new "decoupling" techniques (see item 29 December 1959).  
NYT, 18 Dec 59, p. 7.
- 19 Dec 59 Technical Working Group II, consisting of the US, British, and Soviet experts selected to discuss problems relating to the detection and identification of seismic events (see item of 24 November 1959), reported to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. The group agreed only on possible improvements in the instrumentation and techniques for control posts recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958 (see item of 21 August 1958)--a minor achievement, completely overshadowed by disagreements on other questions. Annex II of the report, a "Statement by the Soviet Experts" (which experts President Eisenhower subsequently termed "politically guided" and whose report he characterized as "intemperate and technically unsupported"), was read to the conference and immediately refuted by Dr. James B. Fisk, the chairman of the US technical group. The Soviet points especially singled out by Dr. Fisk for rebuttal, and his replies, were as follows:  
(1) The Soviets had argued that the new data based on the HARDTACK experiments were invalid because in effect they did not represent a test of the system recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958. Dr. Fisk observed that this assertion was irrelevant and that the instruments used in the HARDTACK experiments had been conclusively shown in the course of the meetings of the Technical Working Group to be superior to those understood by the US group to be recommended by the Geneva experts in 1958.  
(2) The Soviets had charged that not every one of the total number of seismographs used in the HARDTACK experiments was used in every experiment. This had no essential bearing on the results, Dr. Fisk said. Sixteen well-calibrated and well-placed seismographs for any one of these underground experiments were an unusually large number, he pointed out, and the data from them were, he asserted, "good, relevant and complete."  
(3) The Soviets had charged that the source data had been changed as a matter of whim. The source data,



Dr. Fisk said, were the seismograms themselves, 250 of which had been made available to the Soviet delegation in the first few meetings of the Technical Working Group. If the Soviet scientists were willing to do their own homework, Dr. Fisk observed, they would have available all the data on which the US delegation had labored so long.

(4) The Soviets had charged that the US introduced new data at the 19th meeting of the Working Group. Dr. Fisk commented that it was only at the 19th meeting that the Soviets had at last agreed to discuss on a technical basis the very important question of first motion [the direction the seismographic needle swings as the first response to a seismic disturbance]. Furthermore, the so-called new data were obtained by measuring the very seismograms that had been made available to the Soviet delegation earlier.

Dr. Fisk then stated certain conclusions of the US delegation that he thought especially important: (1) The first motion of the seismographic needle was a much less effective method of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions than the Conference of Experts in 1958 had thought. (2) Nuclear explosions could be rendered exceedingly difficult to detect and locate, because the seismic signal of a given explosion could be reduced three-hundredfold or more by placing the explosion underground in a very large cavity of salt or hard rock. (3) Though estimates were uncertain, "about 15,000 earthquakes per year would be located by the system over the whole world, corresponding to earth movements produced by nuclear explosions of more than one kiloton," whereas in the case of "larger explosions, such as 20 kilotons, the number of equivalent earthquakes is about 2,000 world-wide."

In conclusion Dr. Fisk stated the basis of disagreement between the US and the Soviet delegations concerning criteria for classifying as eligible for on-site inspection seismic events detected and located by the control system. Under the Soviet criteria many seismic events detected by the system would be arbitrarily identified as natural earthquakes whereas, in fact, the existing technical knowledge would not permit positive identification of a large number of those same events. The US position was that the criteria should classify as eligible for inspection all seismic events not positively identified as natural earthquakes. Formulation of these criteria was a technical problem. Determination of which eligible events would actually be inspected was a question for the main conference.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (18 Jan 60), 78-80;  
NYT, 20 Dec 59, pp. 1, 27.

21 Dec 59

At a meeting in Paris the Foreign Ministers of the US, the UK, France, Italy, and Canada agreed to propose that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (established the previous September; see items of 10 September and 3 December 1959) should begin its work on or about 15 March 1960 at the previously agreed location, Geneva, subject to the agreement of the Swiss Government. The five Foreign Ministers also agreed that representatives of their governments should meet in Washington during January 1960 to formulate Western proposals for the Ten-Nation Committee. (See following item.)

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (11 Jan 60), 44-46;  
NYT, 22 Dec 59, p. 8.

28 Dec 59

The Soviet Union announced its acceptance of Western proposals for resuming East-West disarmament discussions in Geneva on 15 March. Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania would also attend for the Eastern side. The Western side would be represented by the US, the UK, France, Canada, and Italy. (The Communist nations would thus have parity for the first time at a disarmament conference. Soviet complaints on this point had contributed to the collapse of the London disarmament talks in September 1957. At those talks the Soviet Union had been opposed by the US, the UK, France, and Canada.)

NYT, 29 Dec 59, p. 4; Washington Post and Times Herald, 29 Dec 59, p. A5.

29 Dec 59

With the US voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons testing due to expire on 31 December, the White House announced that the US, though it would feel free to resume testing at any time after that date, would not do so without prior notice. This decision was reached at a conference to which the President had summoned 13 high government officials, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US delegate to the Geneva conference on nuclear testing (James J. Wadsworth), and the head of the delegation of American scientists at the East-West technical talks (James B. Fisk). During the extended period of voluntary suspension of testing following 31 December, the White House announcement said, the US would continue its active program of "weapon research, development, and laboratory-type experimentation."

(A British Foreign Office spokesman said Britain would never resume tests as long as there was a chance for a world ban, the Associated Press reported. French Government sources, according to Reuters, said that the American decision would not affect France's determination to go ahead with its testing. The next day Premier Khrushchev announced to newsmen in Moscow that the USSR would not resume testing unless the West did.)

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (18 Jan 60), 78-79;  
NYT, 30 Dec 59, pp. 1, 3; ibid., 4 Jan 60, p. 1.

29 Dec 59

A panel of US scientists, several of whom had just returned from consultant roles at Geneva, agreed that a new method of staging nuclear explosions underground could make the international test-detection program virtually useless. This new, or "big hole," method, which consisted simply of setting off explosions in large underground caverns instead of in tiny chambers as previously, was discussed by the panel at an American Physical Society meeting at the California Institute of Technology. The use of the new method might dampen "earthquake" waves so much that an A-bomb five times as powerful as that detonated at Hiroshima would register on seismographs as no stronger than a few sticks of TNT. Dr. Harold Brown, nuclear physicist and associate director of the University of California's Livermore Laboratory, a major A-research center, said as spokesman for the panel that the new information raised "some very, very serious doubts about the Geneva detection system."

NYT, 30 Dec 59, p. 3.

31 Dec 59

In response to a memorandum dated 19 November 1959 from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their comments on a study prepared by the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) concerning the problem of detecting underwater nuclear explosions and the possibility of concealing such explosions. (The AFTAC report had concluded that it was theoretically feasible to decouple underwater tests so that only a single technique would be useful for detection--hydroacoustic only for open ocean, and seismic only for deep lakes and sheltered bays--and had stated that if this theoretical feasibility were to be confirmed by further study, tests deep under water should be placed in the same category of difficulty respecting detection and identification as explosions deep underground. The Special Assistant to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering had commented, however, that the cost of the theoretically possible decoupling method described by AFTAC made it impractical.) The conclusion of the JCS was that "considerable" doubt remained concerning whether or not underwater tests could be detected and positively identified in the face of determined efforts to mute, attenuate, or mask the effects of the burst. Further, it was their opinion that if clandestine underwater testing were the sole means by which the Soviet Union could conduct weapons tests to improve Soviet nuclear weapon technology, high costs and construction difficulties would not stand in the way. The "apparent paucity" of information concerning the possibility of decoupling underwater explosions gave concern to the JCS; therefore the Chief of Naval Operations together with the AFTAC, had been requested to make a detailed investigation. For this investigation the JCS requested that the Chief of Naval Research be given access to any studies and technical data available to the conferees at Geneva bearing on the matter. Until it should be established that there was little probability that underwater tests could be concealed, the JCS reaffirmed their position that negotiation on nuclear-test cessation should not include the prohibition of underwater bursts; otherwise, they feared, the US might on this point commit itself to an unenforceable ban.

(S-RD) JCSM-540-59 to SecDef, "Phased Approach to Agreement for Cessation of Nuclear Tests (a)", 31 Dec 59, derived from Encl to (S-RD) Dec On JCS 2179/202, 31 Dec 59; (S-RD) JCS 2179/201. "Phased Approach to Agreement for the Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Test (a)", 23 Nov 59. All in JMF 4613(59).

1 Jan 60

Mr Charles A. Coolidge submitted his Report of the Joint State Department-Defense Department Study on Disarmament (also known as the Joint Disarmament Study and as the Coolidge Report) to the Secretary of State. The study recommended that US disarmament policy (which had been last formally enunciated in the 29 August 1957 "package"; see item) be revised. In particular, the study recommended (1) that the "package" approach be avoided; (2) that only certain initial measures currently compatible with the security of the US be put forth for negotiation; and (3) that subsequent to the adoption of these initial measures, additional measures might be adopted in the light of the world situation then existing and as fast as the security of the US permitted.

For the present, the Coolidge Report recommended, the US should seek agreement on only the following measures: (1) completion of current negotiations to cease nuclear testing, preferably excluding underground tests from the prohibition, (2) establishment of a European zone of inspection against surprise ground attack; (3) prohibition of vehicles capable of mass destruction from being placed in orbit or stationed in outer space; (4) increased efforts under UN auspices to develop and codify international law; (5) enlargement of the jurisdiction of the International Court, including repeal of the Connolly Amendment; (6) UN action to improve procedures for creating a UN "presence" in areas where disputes existed. In addition, the report identified two other measures that could be negotiated immediately without danger to the security of the US; (1) mechanisms for lessening the likelihood of war by accident, and (2) preparatory steps for limiting force levels, confined for the time being to developing plans for carrying out verification and for creation of an international inspection organ. The report said the US should make clear it was not interested in talking about force levels until the Soviets had reduced to the US level of 2.5 million and this had been verified.

The Coolidge Report recommended that certain other specific measures not be negotiated at the present time; it also discussed the reasons therefor and the conditions that should obtain in each case before the measures should be negotiated. These measures were the following: (1) limitation on conventional arms; (2) limitation on nuclear weapons; (3) cutoff or reduction of the production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes; (4) cessation of intercontinental-missile testing; (5) prohibition on transfer of nuclear weapons or weapons-manufacturing capability to other nations; (6) reduction of foreign bases; (7) limitation on military expenditure; (8) limitation on CBR weapons.

The important measures in the 1957 Western package proposals not included in the foregoing were also discussed and reasons given why those issues should not be raised in a forum dealing with general disarmament. These measures were (1) deposit of arms in depots (largely symbolic in value and "scarcely worth pursuing"); (2) an international control organization (this issue had arisen in the nuclear-test-ban talks and should be resolved in that limited context first); (3) political problems like Berlin and German reunification (the 1957 conditioning of future disarmament steps on progress in solving such problems had not proved to be a fruitful approach); (4) control of international movement of armaments (this issue would seriously impinge on the US

military aid program); and (5) provision for suspension of the agreement (a desirable provision but it should be formulated separately for each agreement in the light of the existing circumstances). (See items of 8 and 17 February 1960.)

(8) Report of the Joint State Dept-Defense Dept Study on Disarmament, 1 Jan 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60-- Reports). See also (9) JCS 1731/333, 2 Feb 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 1.

- 12 Jan 60 The Geneva conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing resumed sessions after the Christmas recess.  
NYT, 13 Jan 60, p. 1.
- 14 Jan 60 Premier Khrushchev submitted to the Supreme Soviet for ratification a policy reducing the armed forces of the USSR by 1,200,000 men, to a new level of 2,423,000 men. The official US comment on the Soviet move was made public by the Department of State the same date. The US statement noted that the armed forces level of 3.6 million men now acknowledged for the first time by the Soviet Union made its army and that of its neighbor Communist China the largest standing armies in the world. The US, on the other hand, had demobilized the great bulk of its armed forces immediately after World War II but had been forced by Communist aggression to rebuild their level to approximately 2.5 million men, with conventional armaments in proportion. There would be no means of verifying whether the announced Soviet reductions would actually be carried out, the statement concluded, but the US hoped that the Soviet announcement itself was an indication of willingness to participate in forthcoming disarmament negotiations in a spirit permitting world accord to be established through concrete and verifiable measures of disarmament.  
Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (1 Feb 60), 147; NYT, 15 Jan 60, p. 2.
- 19 Jan 60 The US replied to a Soviet note, received by the State Department on 18 January, calling on the major Western powers to follow the example of the USSR, whose government had adopted a resolution to cut the Soviet armed forces by one-third (see item of 14 January 1960). The US stated that the appropriate place to accomplish disarmament was the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference scheduled to open in Geneva on 15 March.  
Washington Post and Times Herald, 20 Jan 60, p. A8; NYT, 19 Jan 60, p. 2.
- 22 Jan 60 The Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to review their current programs of studies and experimentation on nuclear weapons effects with a view to determining what programs should be continued and how much emphasis such programs should receive. For this purpose he furnished the following criteria: (1) If the realization of useful results was fully dependent on actual tests underwater or in the atmosphere, the programs should be suspended. (2) If results depended on actual tests in outer space or underground, the programs should be continued for the time being in the

planning or preparatory stages, with particular attention given to the design and testing of instrumentation.  
(3) If useful data were obtainable by theoretical and computational methods or by simulation or low-order detonations as defined by the AEC, programs of this type should be given increased emphasis.

(S) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, DDRE, and Chm MLC,  
"Nuclear Weapons Development and Weapons Effects Programs,  
22 Jan 60, Encl to (S) JCS 2179/204, 22 Jan 60.

3 Feb 60

In response to queries at a press conference, President Eisenhower announced that he favored a change in the atomic energy law to permit the US to provide atomic weapons and information to its allies. The President stated that, although he did not favor spreading information that the Soviets did not possess, he had always been convinced that "we should not deny to our allies what [our] potential enemy already has." (See item of 8 February 1960.)

NYT, 4 Feb 60, pp. 1, 12.

6 Feb 60

New York Times correspondent A. M. Rosenthal submitted from Geneva an account of the "delicate, difficult" role of the British at the nuclear-test-ban conference. Mr. Rosenthal reported that during Anglo-American negotiations on the formulation of a new plan that would ban all tests except small-scale underground detonations (see item of 11 February 1960), the British had favored the inclusion of a voluntary Western commitment not to set off any tests at all for a specified period of time in order to give scientists an opportunity to devise better detection methods. British scientists agreed with US scientists that for the time being it was not possible to detect small-scale tests, a circumstance making it possible for any treaty banning such tests to be evaded. The British were not, therefore, pushing for a complete formal treaty ban on testing. But, Mr. Rosenthal continued, the British did believe it was to the net advantage of the West to get a treaty signed, even if a voluntary moratorium on small-scale tests was the price, because international control could then begin. The British considered the prospective establishment of control posts on Soviet territory a political and sociological step of major importance in the history of communism. They also viewed a system to control nuclear tests as a vital experiment providing evidence on whether the Soviet Union would ever allow international control and inspection to work on the scale necessary for world disarmament to become a practical possibility. But though they had their own clear point of view, Mr. Rosenthal was careful to point out, the British at Geneva recognized that the major burden of nuclear responsibility was carried by the US, and they considered it unthinkable that rival British and US plans could ever be put forward at the conference. (See item of 29 March 1959.)

NYT, 7 Feb 60, p. 3.

8 Feb 60

In response to a memorandum from the Administrative Secretary, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated 19 January 1960, the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their comments on the Coolidge Report (see item of 1 January 1960). They noted the need for a revision of US disarmament policy in preparation for the forthcoming international negotiations; a major drawback of the 1957 policy, they recognized, had been the restrictive nature of the "package" approach. The Coolidge Report, they continued, was the most comprehensive treatment of disarmament problems since 1957. It had as an objective to ensure that no agreements limiting US nuclear or other capabilities would be contracted without prior development of suitable conditions, including adequate inspection and controls--something that could not be said of some of the alternative proposals currently being generated within the government

to meet future negotiation requirements. They recommended that the report be sent to the NSC in order that the measures recommended therein for immediate negotiation and those described as "presently" negotiable might be considered as a basis for initial actions in the disarmament area. They requested that they be afforded an opportunity to participate in the drafting of, or to comment on, specific measures proposed as revisions of existing US disarmament policy. Concerning the measures listed in the Coolidge Report as not recommended for immediate negotiation the JCS concurred, but they did not want their agreement with the Coolidge conclusions here to be construed as agreement with his reasoning.

On 17 February 1960 the Secretary of Defense forwarded the foregoing JCS views to the Secretary of State, concurring with the recommendation that the Coolidge Report be submitted to the NSC for consideration.

On 21 February the Secretary of State replied that he considered the Coolidge Report had served a useful purpose as one of the papers for consideration in the formulation of US policy and that he believed its future use should be as a contributing study in continuing interagency staff preparations.

(S) JCSM-46-60 to SecDef, "Report of the Joint State Department-Defense Department Study on Disarmament (U)," 8 Feb 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 2, derived from (S) JCS 1721/333, 2 Feb 60, same file sec 1; (S) 1st N/H of 1731/333, 18 Feb 60, same file, sec 1; (U) JCS 1731/328, 20 Jan 60, ibid.

8 Feb 60

In response to questions at a press conference Secretary of State Herter made certain statements concerning the sharing of nuclear secrets (see item of 3 February 1960 for a Presidential statement on this subject) and the so-called "fourth country" problem (acquisition of nuclear capability by a fourth country). He said that the executive branch had filed no legislation and had none in process to change the law prohibiting the sharing of nuclear secrets or nuclear weapons with other countries. As for the "fourth country" problem, the US had been studying this "very difficult and very complex" problem for a considerable period of time but no decision regarding it had been reached.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (29 Feb 60), 320-326  
esp. 321-322.

9 Feb 60



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11 Feb 60

President Eisenhower announced that on that same day the US was presenting in Geneva a proposal designed to end the apparent deadlock in negotiations concerning the banning of nuclear weapons tests. If accepted, the proposal would end forthwith, under assured controls: (1) all nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere; (2) all nuclear weapons tests in the oceans; (3) all nuclear weapons tests in those regions in space for which it could be agreed that effective controls already existed; and (4) all monitorable nuclear weapons tests beneath the surface of the earth. (Monitorable tests were those with a seismic-magnitude reading of 4.75 or more. One of the agreements reached at a 28 December 1959 meeting of US principals concerned with disarmament had been that in any future US proposal of a test ban above a specified threshold, this threshold should be expressed in seismic magnitude rather than kiloton yield, because of the general agreement among seismologists concerning the relationship between signal amplitude and seismic intensity, and the lack of such agreement concerning kiloton yield.) The US proposal included provision for a program of joint research and experimentation by the UK, the USSR, and the US to improve the detection of small tests underground and thus permit the extension of the ban to such tests. (See following item.)

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (29 Feb 60), 327.

(b) Memo of Conversation, Dept of State, "Nuclear Test Cessation Policy," 700.5611/12-2859, 28 Dec 59, JMF 4613 (28 Dec 59).

11 Feb 60

In presenting the new US nuclear-test-ban proposal at the Geneva conference (see preceding item), US Delegate Wadsworth pointed out that the level of inspection required under a given control-system scheme was closely related to the threshold adopted for the system. If a threshold of magnitude 4.75 were adopted as suggested in the new US proposal, the US further proposed that one of two alternative formulas be adopted for determining the number of seismic events that would be eligible for on-site inspection. These formulas were (1) 20 per cent of all events of magnitude 4.75 or above not identified as earthquakes by application of the criteria suggested by the US experts in Technical Working Group II (see item of 19 December 1959), or (2) 30 per cent of all events of magnitude 4.75 or above registered on the control-system instruments. US scientists, Mr. Wadsworth added, believed the number of on-site inspections each year within the USSR under either formula would be about 20. (See item of 19 March 1960.)

(U) "Verbatim Record of the One Hundred and Seventieth Plenary Meeting, Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests," 11 Feb 60, reprinted in Appendix II in (U) US, Congress, Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection, Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 86th Cong, 2d Sess, 1960, Part II, pp. 527-555, esp. 533-534.

11-12  
Feb 60

The initial Soviet reaction to the West's 11 February proposal (see two preceding items) was unfavorable. The Soviet delegate to the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference termed the proposal "unacceptable," alleging that it was the outgrowth of a "conspiracy" to undermine negotiations and resume testing, and "a step backward" because it would permit renewal of underground nuclear explosions below the threshold proposed by the US. However, the Soviet delegate's informal comments, as reported by New York Times correspondent A. M. Rosenthal, indicated that if the West were to propose a phased treaty coupled with a voluntary moratorium on all tests, the Soviets would probably accept it.

NYT, 12 Feb 60, pp. 1, 2; ibid., 13 Feb 60, pp. 1, 3.

12 Feb 60

In response to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 4 February 1960, the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their views on a draft of proposed US disarmament policy produced by the Department of State as part of its preparation to discuss with the four other nations concerned the position to be taken by the West at the forthcoming Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva. In the first place, the JCS said, the State Department draft was not a proper expression of arms-control policy, but rather a negotiating position paper, both in content and format. Even so, the JCS disagreed with the fundamental philosophy underlying the approach to the arms-control problem reflected in State's draft. Basically, they said, this philosophy seemed to consider the prime test of arms-control proposals to be their "negotiability, political appeal and responsiveness

to the vagaries of world opinion, rather than their tangible effects on the welfare and security of the United States." Implicit in this approach, they said, seemed to be the view that the risks of serious military disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc were intrinsically less dangerous to US security than the political risks of leaving arms-control negotiating initiatives in Soviet hands. As concrete examples of the kind of commitments to which this "negotiation-oriented" approach led, they listed the following measures proposed in the State Department draft for immediate negotiation: (1) to reduce existing force levels, without any reference to any agreed appreciation of how this would affect US security or NATO policy; (2) to cease production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes, without any reference to its long-range effect on US military posture; and (3) to cease the testing of long-range missiles, without an agreed intergovernmental appreciation of its effect on the over-all security of the US and its allies. They pointed out that the Coolidge Report (see item of 1 January 1960) had rejected, because of their unfavorable impact on US security, all three of these proposals as matters for immediate negotiation; and they reminded the Secretary that they had supported the Coolidge views in their memorandum of 8 February 1960. The JCS recommended that the comments in this memorandum of 12 February, together with the proposals made in its attachments (see below), form the basis of the Secretary's reply to State, be used by the National Security Council in developing a US arms control policy, and serve as the US position for negotiations at the Ten-Nation Conference.

The attachments to the memorandum contained a statement of the JCS views on (1) what the US arms-control policy should be, and (2) what the US negotiating position should be. Their proposed policy statement made the point that the US position should not be based on merely political considerations, but also on over-all security considerations, and further that such negotiations should be carried on with the USSR in any appropriate way whenever it appeared that over-all US interests would be served thereby. They incorporated into the statement the portions of the current basic national security policy (NSC 5906/1) dealing with the use of nuclear weapons and with deterring general war and countering local aggression. The broad ultimate goal of the US policy of arms control, they said, was the achievement of world peace under enforceable law. They then set forth 20 specific principles of arms-control policy. Notable among these were the statements that the US would engage in arms-reduction agreements after the study, testing, proving, and adoption of a reliable system of inspection, reporting, and control; that the regulation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery would be avoided except as part of the final and ultimate portion of any arms-control arrangement; that comprehensive proposals calling for arms control in phased stages, with an obligation to move from one stage to another, should be avoided; and that progress toward the arms-reduction and arms-control goal should be made only as fast as the security of the US permitted, the rule in every case being to adopt only those measures compatible with the goal and involving less risk than failure to adopt them.

In their proposed position paper they differed from State notably in their more gradual approach on the above-mentioned three proposals that State considered immediately negotiable. Prior to the setting of any force-level ceilings, the JCS proposals called for the establishment of an international arms-control organization and the collection by that organization of information on the existing force and equipment levels of the various powers, plus an agreement by the powers on the definition of the term "active military forces." Following these preliminaries, initial force-level ceilings would be set at 2.5 million men for the active military forces of the US, the USSR, and Communist China (provided the definition of such forces was the same as that suggested by the JCS in their memorandum of 3 September 1957 to the Secretary of Defense, see item). The State Department proposals had called for an initial force-level ceiling of 2.1 million men, to be applied only to the US and the USSR. In regard to launching programs for long-range missiles, the JCS considered as immediately negotiable only the question of submitting to a disarmament control organization advance information on such launching programs "according to certain predetermined and mutually agreed criteria," and reports of launching operations, including information on the location of launching sites. The JCS proposals would postpone negotiation concerning the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes until specified progress had been made in implementing other arms-control measures. They would postpone even a joint international study of this problem of fissionable materials, or of the question of a cutoff or limitation of long-range-missile testing or production, until a study of each had been made within the US Government and a firm US position established. (See items of 17 and 18 February 1960.)

(S) JCSM-51-60 to SecDef, "U.S. Disarmament Policy (U)," 12 Feb 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 3, derived from (S) JCS 1731/340, 8 Feb 60, same file, sec 2. (S) Memo, Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS, same subj, 4 Feb 60, Encl to (S) JCS 1731/336, 5 Feb 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60), sec 2.

13 Feb 60

France exploded her first atomic device, E from a tower near Reggan a in southwest Algeria.

On 16 February 1960 the French Foreign Ministry announced that France had no intention of joining the nuclear-test-ban talks at Geneva.

NYT, 13 Feb 60, pp. 1, 3; ibid., 17 Feb 60, p. 3.

17 Feb 60

The Secretary of Defense transmitted to the Secretary of State the views of the JCS on State's draft of disarmament policy (see item of 12 February 1960), with which views the Secretary expressed general agreement.

On 21 February the Secretary of State replied. Agreeing that US policy on arms control must be an integral part of national security policy, he said the Department of State considered that basic US policy on disarmament was adequately and soundly set forth in NSC 5906/1, Basic National Security Policy. He quoted from that document a passage stating that it should be "a major objective of the United States, in its own interest and as interrelated parts of its national

policy, actively to seek a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for inspection against surprise attack and for the regulation and reduction of conventional and nuclear armed forces and armaments." The present need, he said, was to develop specific proposals. He denied that State ever proposed measures merely because they might be acceptable to the Soviet Union, but pointed out the US could not hope to implement its basic objectives in this field unless areas of agreement with the Soviet Union could be found. He suggested that the State and Defense staffs meet to set forth areas of agreement between the two departments and also to define the unresolved issues between them so that these could be discussed with the President as soon as possible. (See item of 23 March 1960.)

(S) 1st and (S) 2d N/H's of JCS 1731/340, 18 and 25 Feb 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 2.

18 Feb 60 President Eisenhower decided that cessation of production of fissionable materials would be among the proposals the US would make as negotiating measures at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference.

(S) SADAM-50-60, "U.S. Disarmament Policy," 25 Feb 60, Encl to (S) SM-181-60, same subj and date, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 3.

18 Feb 60 In an address before the National Press Club at Washington, Secretary of State Herter singled out for special mention two dangers in the arms race that made urgent the need for progress in the forthcoming negotiations to be conducted by the Ten-Nation Committee (see item of 21 December 1959). These two dangers were (1) war by miscalculation, because of the ever shorter reaction times resulting from constant improvement of strategic delivery systems, and (2) the proliferating production of nuclear weapons, which might eventually enable almost any country, however irresponsible, to secure these weapons.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (7 Mar 60), 355. NYT, 19 Feb 60, pp. 1, 4.

22 Feb 60 John W. Finney, New York Times Washington correspondent, reported that the Department of Defense had ordered the construction of two experimental stations for a network monitoring an international ban on atomic tests. One station would be built along the lines suggested by the 1958 Geneva experts' conference; the other station, Mr. Finney wrote, would contain "better instrumentation, such as was proposed last year by a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee" (see item of 16 March 1959.) Mr. Finney reported that the Department of Defense order was part of Project VELA, which had as its other objectives: (1) procurement and installation of standard-calibrated seismographs at a number of selected stations; (2) basic research programs on the generation and propagation of seismic waves; (3) research on improved detection methods, such as improved seismographs in deep holes; (4) a program of nonnuclear explosions to support seismic research, and (5) short-term special studies, such as current feasibility studies into the use of unmanned seismic stations to supplement the 180-station network. (See item of 7 May 1960.)

NYT, 22 Feb 60, pp. 1, 3.

2 Mar 60

The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 24 February 60, requesting their views regarding the military implications of an international agreement on the following measure proposed by the Department of State:

Agreement that after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production would be transferred under international supervision and control to non-weapons uses including stockpiling. Transfer of successive agreed quantities would depend upon significant progress in other disarmament areas.

Appending a statement of the considerations on which their thinking was based, the Joint Chiefs stated that the Department of Defense should recommend US adherence to the principle that steps leading toward the dismantling of US nuclear stockpiles should be avoided until the final portion of any arms-control arrangement. Further, steps leading toward the dismantling of US nuclear stockpiles must necessarily follow and be contingent upon progress in less sensitive areas of disarmament--in particular upon significant progress in the reduction of the total conventional capability of the Soviet bloc, including Communist China. But if it were decided that the US must offer to negotiate immediately for the establishment of the inspection and control mechanism to govern transfer of fissionable materials to nonweapons uses, the US should insist that the initial "increments" be relatively small and that the US and the USSR contributions be in equal rather than proportional amounts. Further, it should be US policy that any subsequent transfers of fissionable material having a significant effect upon US military nuclear capability should be subject to the conditions recommended above regarding the timing of any dismantling of US nuclear stockpiles.

(S) JCSM-73-60 to SecDef, "U.S. Disarmament Policy (U)," 2 Mar 60, derived from (S) JCS 1731/345, 27 Feb 60; (S) JCS 1731/341, 24 Feb 60. All in JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 3.

2 Mar 60

The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, dated 24 February 1960, in which the Secretary had quoted the following proposed measure and requested a definitive answer to the following question relating to that measure:

Cessation of all further flight testing of IRBMs and ICBMs immediately upon the installation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. All further peaceful uses testing of rockets would be conducted only as part of an internationally agreed program. Upon the installation of appropriate inspection measures, agreed limitations would be imposed upon the numbers and the production and/or development of long-range missiles and of other

long-range delivery systems such as aircraft and submarines. Subsequently agreed reductions would take place.

Question. What would be the effect on the relative military posture of the United States and her Allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc including Communist China of the adoption of an international agreement along the lines of the above measure, effective in January 1962; 1963; 1965?

They recommended that the foregoing be used by the Defense Department representatives in the development of the related study headed by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (see items of 10 December 1959 and 4 March 1960), and that the JCS be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on that study prior to its referral to the NSC.

On 8 March 1960 the Secretary of Defense forwarded the foregoing JCS memorandum to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, requesting that the JCS comments be used in conjunction with the study being conducted for the NSC under the direction of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology regarding the feasibility of monitoring a ban of the sort commented on by the JCS. He also requested that the JCS be afforded the opportunity they desired for reviewing and commenting on Dr. Kiskiatowsky's study before its referral to the NSC. (See item of 18 March 1960.)

(S) JCSM-74-60 to SecDef, "U.S. Disarmament Policy (U)," 2 Mar 60, derived from (S) JCS 1731/346, 29 Feb 60; (S) JCS 1731/342, 26 Feb 60; 1st N/H of JCS 1731/346. All in JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 3.

4 Mar 60

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~~(TS)~~ JCSM-81-60 to SecDef, "U.S. Disarmament Policy (U)," 4 Mar 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 4, derived from ~~(TS)~~ JCS 1731/348, 1 Mar 60, same file, sec 3; ~~(TS)~~ JCS 1731/343, 26 Feb 60.

4 Mar 60

In response to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 2 February 1960, the JCS submitted their comments to the Secretary of Defense on an ISA draft statement defining objectives and criteria that should guide the US approach to problems of arms reduction and control. The JCS stated that they considered the draft statement to be a useful basis for development of broad US objectives and the corollary negotiating position on arms control. The draft statement in question was very close in thought and language to the proposed statement of policy and negotiating position submitted by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on 12 February 1960 (see item).



(TS) JCSM-86-60 to SecDef, "Outline of Basic Approach to Disarmament (U)," 4 Mar 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 4, derived from Encl to (TS) Dec On JCS 1731/344, 4 Mar 60, same file, sec 3; (S) JCS 1731/335, 5 Feb 60, same file, sec 2.

4 Mar 60

Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, completed the report ("The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production") called for by NSC Action No. 2161, 10 December 1959 (see item). (A revised version was issued on 14 March, but the revisions were few and did not significantly change the conclusions.) The report warned that its conclusions were subject to the understanding that the following aspects had not been adequately considered: (1) the implications of abrogation of any of the possible agreements that might be reached; (2) the relationship of the arms-control measures discussed in the report to other measures, including general disarmament; (3) the implications of inhibiting the attainment of nuclear delivery capabilities by other nations than the US, UK, and USSR; (4) the "dissymmetries" between the US and the USSR in the problems of maintaining production and/or test facilities, and in capability when limitations on production and/or test facilities were in force, (5) the detailed inspection-team requirements and cost for monitoring a production ban; (6) specific limitations and controls that might be imposed on space programs and the organization of a possible international authority to carry out space programs; and (7) the implications of increased emphasis on other delivery systems that might result from agreements limiting missile tests or production. On the basis of this study, particularly in view of the above limitations, it had not been possible to determine whether a test ban in 1963, or at any later time, would be to the net advantage or disadvantage of the US.

The report's conclusions on specific points were based on the latest NIE of Soviet stockpile growth and on consideration of those approved or proposed US missile-program schedules that appeared reasonably attainable if adequately supported. These conclusions were:

On missile-test monitoring: (1) Existing scanning radars justified high confidence that detection of ballistic-missile flights could be accomplished. The siting of some radars within the Sino-Soviet bloc and within the US would be required. The installation of such a detection system would require about 2 years. To detect with certainty missiles rising from within the Sino-Soviet bloc to an apogee of 75 nautical miles or more would require about 15 radars. Of these at least 4 or 5 would have to be located within the Communist bloc, but the remainder could be located in friendly countries around the periphery. Such radar monitoring could not detect static or tethered firings of long-range ballistic missiles or assure detection of short-range firings of such missiles; nor could it detect flights by aerodynamic vehicles. Therefore tests of these kinds should not be prohibited by any agreement unless there were some other agreed means for monitoring them. (2) Such a means could be provided,

but it would require expansion of the system described in (1) to about 100 radars. This expansion would result in a world-wide high-confidence system for monitoring missile tests of all kinds. Possibly, a less expensive flight-detection system could be operational by 1963.

On relationship of a missile test ban to space programs: (1) For a test ban to be effective in limiting missile development, both civilian and military space programs would have to be abandoned, or subjected to rigid inspection and some controls, or internationalized. (2) Unless space efforts were abandoned altogether, some feed-through from space programs into possible missile development programs would be inevitable, but inspection teams would be in a position to assess the degree of danger represented by the applicability of space techniques to military developments. (3) Effective inspection would require advance disclosure of all space firings, the right of teams to inspect in advance of firing all space vehicles with their components and associated equipment, and access by both sides to all technical results. (4) Internationalization of the space effort could reduce the effects of feed-through to a minimal level and could also lower the "risks associated with the possibility of technological surprise."

On implications of a missile-flight test ban: (1) A missile-flight test ban would represent a considerable risk for the US if implemented as early as January 1961. A test ban so dated as to preclude the confident operational development of the mobile MINUTEMAN and the 1500-n.m. POLARIS would be disadvantageous to the US. On the basis of the production programs used in the study, early 1963 would be the earliest possible date for such a ban. Otherwise, there did not appear to be any decisive reason for believing the risk to the US (or the USSR) would be either greater or less if there were a missile test ban in 1963 than if there were no such ban. (2) Any test ban dependent on radar coverage for monitoring should provide sufficient lead time for construction of radar sites to begin 2 years before the effective date of the ban. Alternative monitoring systems might involve comparable lead times.

Monitoring of a missile-production ban or limitation: (1) A missile-production ban or limitation could be monitored if, and only if, the following two conditions were met: (a) The agreement guaranteed a right to unrestricted and self-initiated access by the inspection teams to any point in the Sino-Soviet bloc; (b) the inspection directorate had the right to valid aerial photography of the entire Sino-Soviet bloc on a periodic basis. (A prior inventory of bloc missile stockpiles and selected industrial facilities would probably be required for monitoring production, and in any case would be needed to insure that the stockpile when monitoring began was not greatly different from the estimate in the NIE on which the study had been based.) (2) Given the foregoing conditions, it would probably be possible to set a large enough quota (if a quota were desired) on the permitted number of inspections to avoid seriously degrading the confidence

of the monitoring system. In the event of a production limitation, however, or in the event of a continuing national space program, continuous inspection of certain key facilities, such as missile and space production installations, would be required. (3) The inspection teams would be concerned not only with the production of the missiles themselves, but also with the production of the support equipment necessary to give the missiles an operational status. It seemed probable that inspection of launchers and launch sites would be of great use; further study might reveal such inspection to be at least as important as inspection of missile production. (4) US intelligence data could provide valuable support to the activities of inspection teams. (5) Despite inspection of the sort envisaged in the report, there would remain the possibility of a small flow of clandestinely produced missiles. One or two such missiles a month might involve a relatively low risk of detection, but five or more a month would probably be regarded as highly risky by the USSR.

On implications of a missile-production ban: An absolute ban on production would be dangerous to the US if implemented as early as 1961. With delay, the danger would diminish. By January 1963 there might still be significant risk, but by January 1964 (or possibly earlier if US production were accelerated), the risk should be smaller.

On implications of a limitation on missile production: If implemented as early as 1961, a limitation that permitted production of at least several times the estimated clandestine production capability could improve the US position. This conclusion was contingent on the USSR's not already having an overwhelming initial attack force that would make it necessary to accelerate already-planned US missile production. With the passage of time, the advantage of a limitation over an absolute ban would diminish in importance. In the event of an agreement to limit production, a continuation of flight testing would seem advantageous up until early 1963 because, by permitting the attainment of hardening and mobility by both sides, it would promote stability. After 1963, continued flight testing might be disadvantageous in that such testing would permit further improvements in the guidance accuracies of both sides (particularly that of the USSR).

(TS-ND) Report, "Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production," 4 Mar 60, files of SADA (reference JCS 1731/358).

5 Mar 60

The Department of State announced the members of the US delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference scheduled to begin at Geneva on 15 March 1960. Headed by Fredrick M. Eaton, whose appointment as US representative and chairman of the delegation had been announced on 3 December 1959 (see item), the delegation had 19 members.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (21 Mar 60), 466.

12 Mar 60 The US Atomic Energy Commission announced a research program that would attempt to answer the critical questions of how and to what extent radiation caused damage to the human body. Among the basic problems to be solved was the determination of the existence or nonexistence of a "threshold," a level of radiation below which no damage was caused.  
NYT, 13 Mar 60, p. 2.

14 Mar 60 The UK proposed to the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference that the projected policing organization be empowered, in investigating suspicious disturbances, to conduct special air-sampling flights--with British and American observers for flights over the Soviet Union, and Soviet observers for flights over US or British territory. The country in which a nuclear explosion was suspected would also have a representative on these flights.  
NYT, 15 Mar 60, p. 3.

14 Mar 60 On the eve of the date set for the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference to convene, the participating Western nations made public a Five-Power Working Paper in which the proposals they had agreed to lay before the conference were set forth. (The proposals were formally submitted at the conference on 16 March.) The paper began by stating three guiding principles: (1) The ultimate goal was a "secure, free, and peaceful world" in which there should be general disarmament under effective international control and agreed procedures for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. (2) The task of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference should be to work out measures leading to general disarmament, which could only be attained by "balanced, phased, and safeguarded" agreements. (3) All measures of disarmament must be observed and verified by an appropriate international organization.

There followed the actual proposals, arranged in three groups. In the first group were listed measures "proposed with the recommendation that they be undertaken forthwith." These were the following:

A. The establishment of an International Disarmament Organization by progressive steps following a joint study of the composition and functions of such an organization and its relationship to the United Nations (taking into account previous experience in this field).

B. Prior notification to the International Disarmament Organization of proposed launchings of space vehicles and the establishment of co-operative arrangements for communicating to the International Disarmament Organization data obtained from available tracking facilities.

C. The collection of information on present force levels (active uniformed military manpower) and on armaments pertaining to land, sea, and air forces possessed by the various powers. The collection of information would be based mainly

on declarations by States according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria.

D. The coordinated reduction or limitation of force levels and conventional armaments upon the establishment of agreed arrangements and procedures for initial and continuing verification by the International Disarmament Organization as follows:

1. Initial force level ceilings to be:  
2.5 million for the Soviet Union  
2.5 million for the United States, and  
agreed appropriate force levels for certain other States.

2. Each State party to the agreement shall place in storage depots, within its own territories and under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization agreed types and quantities of conventional armaments to be set forth in lists annexed to the agreement and bearing a relationship to the agreed force levels.

E. The submission by the various states to the International Disarmament Organization of data relating to: the operation of their financial system as it affects military expenditures, the amount of their military expenditures, and the percentage of their gross national product earmarked for military expenditures. The data to be submitted will be drawn up in accordance with predetermined and mutually agreed criteria.

F. Joint studies will be undertaken immediately on the following subjects:

1. Measures to assure compliance with an agreement that no nation shall place into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction, including provision for on-site inspection.

2. Measures to assure compliance with an agreement on prior notification of missile launchings, according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria, and on declarations to the International Disarmament Organization of locations of launching sites, and places of manufacture, of such missiles.

3. Measures to assure compliance with an agreement to discontinue the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

4. Arrangements required to carry out an agreement to transfer, under international supervision and control, fissionable material from past production to nonweapons uses, including stockpiling.

5. Measures to give participating States greater protection against surprise attack with effective verification procedures including aerial inspection, ground observers at agreed points, mobile ground teams, overlapping radar, notification of aircraft flights, and appropriate communications facilities and arrangements.

6. Measures to verify budgetary information submitted by the various states to the International Disarmament Organization.

7. Means of preventing aggression and preserving world peace and security, as national armaments are reduced, by an international organization, to be an organ of, or linked to, the United Nations.

8. Timing and manner of extending a disarmament agreement so as to include other States having significant military capabilities, with a view to the holding of a disarmament conference.

In the second group were listed the following measures, which were to be "undertaken as rapidly as possible upon successful completion of relevant preparatory studies" outlined above:

A. The prohibition against placing into orbit or stationing in outer space vehicles capable of mass destruction to be effective immediately after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify this measure.

B. Prior notification to the International Disarmament Organization of proposed launchings of missiles according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria, and declarations of locations of launching sites, and places of manufacture of such missiles, with agreed verification including on-site inspection of launching sites of such missiles.

C. The cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes immediately after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify this measure, conditional upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament.

D. Agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production to be transferred under international supervision and control to non-weapons uses, including stockpiling, immediately upon the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

E. Establishment of appropriate measures to give participating States greater protection against surprise attack, including aerial inspection, ground observers at agreed points, mobile ground teams, overlapping radar, notification of aircraft flights, and appropriate communications.

F. A disarmament conference with other States having significant military capabilities, called to consider their accession to the disarmament agreement, including their acceptance of appropriate reductions or limitations of their respective force levels and armaments.

G. Force level ceilings for all militarily significant States and appropriate inspection and verification measures to go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of force level ceilings of 2.1 million for the US and USSR. At the same time, each of the States participating shall agree to place in storage depots agreed types and quantities of armaments in agreed relation to the force level ceilings.

H. The establishment of measures to verify budgetary information.

I. Further progressive development of the International Disarmament Organization.

J. Initial establishment of the international organization to preserve world peace.

In the third group were listed "additional measures which are regarded as necessary for achieving the ultimate goal":

A. Reduction of national armed forces and armaments by progressive safeguarded steps (after such further joint studies as may be necessary) to levels required by internal security and fulfillment of obligations under the United Nations Charter to the end that no single nation or group of nations can effectively oppose enforcement of international law.

B. Measures toward this objective, phased to coincide with the build-up of international law enforcement capability to preserve world peace, and with the extension of the International Disarmament Organization to provide necessary inspection and control, will include:

1. Prohibition of production of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction.
2. Further reduction of existing stocks of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction, further transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful use, and further steps, in the light of the latest scientific knowledge, to achieve the final elimination of these weapons.
3. Measures to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.
4. Control of the production of agreed categories of military missiles and existing national stocks and their final elimination.
5. Establishment of effective international control over military budgets.
6. Completion of the establishment of international organizations and arrangements to preserve world peace.
7. Final reduction of military manpower and armaments to the levels required for the objective stated in para. A above, including the disposition of surplus armaments.
8. Control over the production of all remaining types of armaments to ensure that production is limited to that required for purposes specified in para. A.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (4 Apr 60), 511-513.  
(U) Tab K to ~~18~~ JCS 1731/407 (Report of Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . .), 12 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 15. (U) "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . ., Geneva, Switzerland, March 15--June 28, 1960," 5 Aug 60, same file, sec 14.

15 Mar 60

The Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference convened at Geneva. In both a letter from Premier Khrushchev and an opening statement by Soviet Delegate Valerian A. Zorin, the Communists announced that their position at the conference would be that presented by Premier Khrushchev in his 18 September 1959 speech to the UN (see item). The Communists responded to the Western working paper of 14 March (see item) by stating that they would give it further thought. They complained,



however, that the Western plan did not lead to disarmament, that it had no timetable, and that it concentrated on studying disarmament instead of carrying it out. (See item of 11 April 1960.)

NYT, 16 Mar 60, pp. 1, 5 (text of statements on p. 4).

16 Mar 60

In response to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 4 March 1960, the JCS submitted recommended terms of reference for joint interdepartmental studies on the following subjects, for use in providing guidance to the US delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva:

(1) Measures necessary to assure compliance with an agreement that no nation should place into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction, including provision for on-site inspection.

(2) Measures necessary to assure compliance with an agreement on prior notification of long-range-missile launchings, including a definition of the missiles to be covered.

(3) Measures to give participating states greater protection against surprise attack, including aerial inspection, ground observers at agreed points, overlapping radar, notification of aircraft flights, and appropriate communications, which could be applied in zones as follows:

(a) Eastern Siberia - Alaska/Canada area and/or the area north of 70° north latitude, together with arrangements for reporting flights of all aircraft within the area.

(b) A comparable zone in Europe, of dimensions agreed to by the North Atlantic Council.

The JCS recommended that the foregoing proposed studies be conducted, under the terms of reference proposed by the JCS, as joint interdepartmental studies at national level with participation by the Department of Defense, including representatives of the JCS, and that these studies take place prior to the US delegation's tabling of terms of reference for such studies on a multinational basis. The US, the JCS said, should not agree to international study of these problems without their first having been studied within the US Government and firm US positions established.

The JCS also submitted recommended US negotiating positions on the following two matters mentioned among the first-stage proposals of the Western nations' working paper tabled at Geneva on 16 March (see item of 14 March 1960): (1) the terms of an agreement on prior notification of launching of space vehicles and on co-operative arrangements for communicating data obtained from tracking facilities; (2) the criteria that would determine information to be collected on existing force levels and conventional armament.

Finally, as requested by the Assistant Secretary, the JCS submitted suggested procedures for initial and continuing verification of first-stage force ceilings, and commented on the types and quantities of

conventional armaments that might be placed in international storage. They questioned the usefulness of drawing up at this time a list of armaments for possible storage; this step would be premature, they thought, because of the dependency of such a list on agreements yet to be negotiated.

(S) JCSM-107-60 to SecDef, "Backstopping for the U.S. Delegation to Ten Nation Disarmament Conference (U)," 16 Mar 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 5; derived from (S) JCS 1731/356, 11 Mar 60, same file; (S) JCS 1731/350, 7 Mar 60, same file, sec 4.

16 Mar 60

The US Atomic Energy Commission announced that it had scheduled for early 1961 a series of underground nuclear explosions to determine the feasibility of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The AEC indicated that indirectly the explosions would also aid seismological research. The Commission stated that the results would be made available on a worldwide basis and that the United States would welcome observers from the United Nations or any of its member countries.

NYT, 17 Mar 60, pp. 1, 3.

16 Mar 60

Mr. David Ormsby-Gore, head of the UK delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference, announced to the conference the West's eagerness to get quick action on the banning of orbiting space vehicles carrying nuclear weapons. New York Times correspondent A. M. Rosenthal reported that this move was viewed by the West as a concession to Soviet hopes for some agreement before the Summit meeting and also as a manifestation of the growing apprehension concerning "accidental" war.

NYT, 17 Mar 60, pp. 1, 3.

18 Mar 60

In response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 14 March 1960, the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their comments on the study prepared under the direction of Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky on the feasibility and national-security implications of a monitored agreement to stop or limit ballistic-missile testing and/or production (see items of 10 December 1959 and 4 March 1960). Despite terms of reference that seemed sufficiently comprehensive, the JCS commented, the study had failed to give adequate consideration to seven interrelated areas of major concern, as the study itself pointed out. As a result, in the opinion of the JCS, the study did not provide an adequate basis for the formulation of a broad policy on the control of missiles. But when construed in the light of the detailed comments appended by the JCS to their memorandum, the study did afford, the JCS said, a sufficient basis for concluding that the US should not "at this time" propose any limitation on the testing or production of missiles to become effective at any foreseeable date. Other nations would undoubtedly advance proposals on this subject, however, and therefore the JCS recommended that the US complete a study of all major aspects of the problem as soon as possible in order to provide its negotiators with adequate policy guidance.

(TS) JCSM-108-60 to SecDef, "Study Entitled 'The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement to Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production' (U)," 18 Mar 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 6, derived from (TS) JCS 1731/360, 17 Mar 60, same file; (TS) JCS 1731/358, 15 Mar 60, same file, sec 5.

19 Mar 60

At the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference Soviet Delegate S. K. Tsarapkin made a counterproposal to the US proposal of 11 February 1960 (see items). The Soviet proposal was as follows:

To conclude a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in the oceans and in outer space, and of all underground tests which produce seismic oscillations of magnitude 4.75 conventional units or above.

In regard to unidentified underground events producing seismic oscillations below magnitude 4.75 conventional units, which according to the United States contention do not lend themselves to control, the Soviet Government is prepared to agree to the United States proposal to institute a programme of joint research and experiments by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, on the understanding that all parties to the treaty assume at the same time the obligation not to carry out during that period any nuclear weapon tests producing seismic oscillations of magnitude 4.75 conventional units or below.

In the course of his extensive preliminary remarks, Mr. Tsarapkin repeated the Soviet position on inspection. The Soviet Government believed, he said, that "the question of inspection could and should be settled as a political question, independently of the contentious problem of the number of unidentified events." In response to a question by US Delegate Wadsworth after the proposal had been laid before the conference, Mr. Tsarapkin said that a time limit for completion of the joint research program could be fixed at the time the treaty sections dealing with that subject came under practical discussion. A further question by Mr. Wadsworth elicited the reply that it was an essential point of the Soviet proposal that the agreement to refrain from testing below the limit of seismic magnitude 4.75 should be reflected in some way in the treaty; the form was not important--it might be an article, an annex, or a separate protocol, to mention examples--but it should be part of the treaty. (See next item.)

(U) "Verbatim Record of the One Hundred and Eighty-eighth Plenary Meeting, Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests," 19 Mar 60, reprinted in Appendix 2 of (U) US, Congress, Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 86th Cong, 2d Sess, 1960, Part II, pp. 557-572, esp. pp. 567 and 569-572.

21 Mar 60

In reply to questions from US Delegate Wadsworth at the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference, Soviet Delegate Tsarapkin made the following points in clarification of the Soviet proposal of 19 March (see item): (1) As regarded the joint research program to be carried on by US, Soviet, and British scientists, "five years or four years, for example, would be roughly the suitable length for this program." (The Soviet-proposed moratorium on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold would continue throughout this period.) (2) If the joint research program were not successfully completed within the agreed time--but Mr. Tsarapkin considered this eventuality highly unlikely--the governments concerned would have to discuss the matter and agree on further measures in regard to it. (3) The Soviet Government could not accept the US effort to link the quota of inspections with the number of unidentified events. The question of inspection must be solved as a political one; on this matter the Soviet position was "absolutely firm." (4) No threshold should be fixed with regard to inspection. Events both above and below the so-called threshold of magnitude should be subject to inspection within the limitation of the agreed quota. This inspection quota could be reviewed in the light of practical experience after the control system had been in operation for 2 years, and thereafter could be reviewed annually. (5) As to high-altitude explosions, the language of the US position was too vague to be acceptable to the USSR; Mr. Tsarapkin would like to have the US position expressed more clearly and definitely. The Soviet position on this point was that the prohibition on carrying out nuclear explosions at high altitudes should be written into the treaty without reservation. (See items of 24 and 29 March 1960.)

(U) "Verbatim Record of the One Hundred and Eighty-ninth Plenary Meeting, Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests," 21 Mar 60, reprinted in Appendix 2 of (U) US, Congress, Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 86th Cong, 2d Sess, 1960, Part II, pp. 557-572, esp. pp. 584-586.

21 Mar 60

At the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva the USSR, in what its own spokesman described as a major step towards meeting Western complaints that the Soviet disarmament timetable would put nuclear controls into effect only after the nations had been left without other defenses, offered to present a new disarmament timetable that would move total prohibition of nuclear weapons from last place to first. (See items of 2 June and 7 June 1960.)

NYT, 22 Mar 60, pp. 1, 2.

23 Mar 60

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense the JCS (1) questioned the adequacy of current basic US policy on disarmament, and (2) expressed concern regarding revisions of the US disarmament position without review by the JCS. In regard to (1), they recalled that they had submitted a proposed draft of US policy on arms control with their memorandum of 12 February 1960 to the Secretary of Defense (see item) and that the Secretary of State had subsequently commented that

basic US policy on disarmament was adequately and soundly set forth in the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1; see item of 17 February 1960). The JCS contended that though the statement in NSC 5906/1 had been approved as recently as August 1959, it was too broad to provide a sufficiently detailed frame of reference either for formulating arms-control measures or for negotiating agreements. These remarks applied with particular reference, they made clear, to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Further, the NSC had not addressed itself to the total US disarmament negotiating position since mid-1957, and the US and Western negotiating position presented to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference was "substantially different" from the approved 1957 position. Accordingly, the JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense submit for NSC consideration a comprehensive statement of US arms-control policy essentially similar to that submitted to him by the JCS with their memorandum of 12 February 1960.

As for (2), the JCS observed that their opinion had been solicited piecemeal concerning various proposed statements of policy, objectives, and negotiating positions relating to the over-all question of arms control. They pointed out, however, that the US position resulting from the agreement reached by the five Western nations preparatory to going to Geneva had been revised "numerous times" without review by the JCS. The JCS were aware of the press of time; nevertheless, it was their considered judgment that they should be given an opportunity to review and comment on all substantive issues involving a modification of the basic US position that had been agreed to by the five Western nations and tabled at the opening of the Ten-Nation Disarmament conference.

On 8 April 1960 the Deputy Secretary of Defense informed the JCS that their recommendation concerning NSC consideration of a comprehensive statement of US disarmament policy had been referred to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) with instructions to initiate action toward that end. In regard to the other JCS recommendation, the Deputy Secretary stated that when importance warranted and time permitted, the formal views of the JCS would be sought on issues arising from the Geneva negotiations. He warned, however, that frequently there might not be time for formal and deliberate consideration. He suggested that the JCS try to keep themselves current on developments in the negotiations, so as to be able to act swiftly when necessary. The disarmament staff of the Assistant Secretary (ISA) was prepared at all times to furnish pertinent information.

(S) JCSM-117-60 to SecDef, "United States Disarmament Policy (U)," 23 Mar 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 6, derived from (S) JCS 1731/362, 23 Mar 60, same file.  
(S) 1st N/H of JCS 1731/362, same file. See also (S) JCS 1731/357, 11 Mar 60, and (S) JCS 1731/359, 16 Mar 59, both in JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 5.

24 Mar 60

The NSC discussed the "feasibility and national security implications of a monitored agreement to stop or limit ballistic missile testing and/or production," in the light of (1) the report presented by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

(see item of 4 March 1960) and (2) the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see item of 18 March 1960).  
(IS) NSC Action No. 2198, 24 Mar 60 (approved by President 31 Mar 60).

28 Mar 60

The West, at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference, presented outline proposals for a veto-free disarmament commission, loosely connected with the UN, to inspect every disarmament step. The powers and staff of the new commission would grow with each disarmament step; the executive committee of the commission would comprise 14 member nations, with no right on the part of the major powers to veto.

NYT, 29 Mar 60, 1, 9.

29 Mar 60

President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan issued a joint statement noting the problems still to be resolved at the nuclear-test-ban conference in Geneva and advancing a proposal designed to facilitate agreement on a test-ban treaty. The problems mentioned by the two heads of government included determination of an adequate program of on-site inspections and agreement on the following: composition of the control commission, control-post staffing, voting matters, and arrangements for peaceful-purposes detonations. As soon as a treaty covering these questions should be signed and arrangements made for a coordinated research program for the purpose of improving control methods for events below a seismic magnitude of 4.75, the President and Prime Minister said, they would be ready to institute a voluntary moratorium of agreed duration on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold mentioned, to be accomplished by unilateral declaration of each of the three powers. The wording of the statement made it clear that provided all the conditions set forth therein were agreed to by the Soviet Union, the two Western leaders looked forward to declaring the moratorium after the treaty was signed but before it had been ratified and placed in effect. (For JCS comment on certain aspects of the above-proposed moratorium see item of 13 June 1960.)

NYT, 30 Mar 60, pp. 1, 31 (text of statement on p. 31). Text is also in (U) Msg, SecState to AmConsul Geneva NUSUP 757, 29 Mar 60, DA IN 717538, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 6.

1 Apr 60 France exploded her second atomic bomb at the Reggan range in the Sahara. (On 4 April, France notified the UN that she had no plan for carrying out additional tests.)  
 NYT, 1 Apr 60, pp. 1, 3; ibid., 5 Apr 60, p. 9.

4 Apr 60 The Soviet Union at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference rejected the Western proposal to ban the launching into orbit of satellites carrying weapons of mass destruction (see item of 14 March 60). The Soviet representative stated that the USSR would agree to such a proposal only if the US agreed to liquidate all of its military bases abroad. The Soviet representative charged that the Western plan was an example of the US purpose of using the disarmament talks as a means of catching up with the USSR in fields where the US was lagging.  
 NYT, 5 Apr 60, pp. 1, 8.

11 Apr 60 The Soviet representative at the Ten-Nation Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, ostensibly to find a way out of the stalemate up to that point, tabled a document entitled "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament." (The stalemate had developed after it became apparent that neither side was prepared to make any material changes in its basic position taken at the opening of the conference in mid-March. The Soviet bloc's position was represented by the Soviet total-disarmament proposal of 18 September 1959 [see item], that of the Western nations by the Five-Power Working Paper made public on 14 March 1960 [see item].) The new Soviet document stated that general and complete disarmament should (1) include the disbanding of all armaments and armed forces; (2) be achieved in a sequence of three stages within four years; (3) be implemented under international control; (4) result in states having only internal-security forces of an agreed size; and (5) not be interrupted by any condition not covered in the treaty. In addition, the document proposed a "concrete measure": states possessing nuclear weapons should "solemnly declare" they would not be the first to use them.

(The reaction of the West was that except for the "concrete measure," there was no essential difference between the new document and the 18 September 1959 disarmament proposal. As for the "concrete measure," it was unacceptable because it contemplated an uncontrolled paper proclamation that would in no way assure world stability or security. See item of 25 April 1960.)

(U) "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . , Geneva, Switzerland, March 15--June 28, 1960," 5 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 14.

14 Apr 60 The three powers at the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference agreed to a meeting of Western and Soviet scientists on the problems of detecting nuclear explosions (see item of 11 May 1960). The conference then recessed until 25 April 1960.  
 NYT, 15 Apr 60, pp. 1, 2.

15 Apr 60 The proposals of Gen Lauris Norstad (US Commander in Chief, Europe, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) for a control and inspection system in Europe were cabled in outline form through State Department channels for transmission to OSD (ISA). Gen Norstad prefaced his

proposals with six criteria he believed essential to any plan of this nature to be put forward at this time by the West: (1) It should strike public opinion in the West and neutral countries as an easily understandable and workable first step toward the easing of tensions; (2) it should not prejudice existing Western positions on Germany, Berlin, or disarmament; (3) it should not be wholly dependent on Soviet acceptance of broader Western objectives; (4) it should avoid any provisions requiring a change in the basic East-West power balance at this time; (5) it should serve a useful purpose in itself and abate tensions without further steps; and (6) if found workable in practice, it could lay the groundwork for future consideration of other proposals bearing on European security.

Gen Norstad's proposals in the light of these criteria included the following: (A) Mobile ground inspection in as large an area as possible between the Atlantic and the Urals, an irreducible minimum to be "the two Germanys, Poland Czechoslovakia Benelux and at least a part of Denmark, or the equivalent"; (B) aerial inspection of an area not less than that covered by ground inspection; (C) overlapping radar stations, one line to be maintained by the West on the eastern perimeter of inspection and vice versa; (D) scope of inspection to include (1) exchange of information on types and location of existing and firmly programmed forces, (2) verification of this information, (3) advance exchange of information on movements, (4) periodic reports by mobile teams on the ground and from aerial reconnaissance, (5) possession of its own line of communications by each side, (6) full access by teams to areas of military significance, but no right of entry into private buildings, and (7) no technical inspections of equipment or access to nuclear storage depots themselves; (E) size of inspection group not to exceed 3,000 inspectors for both East and West, including staff but excluding personnel for radar installations or aerial reconnaissance; (F) inspection teams to consist of mixed East-West teams operating throughout entire inspection area (no line down middle of Germany) and reporting to military superiors and possibly an appropriate UN organ (avoiding any recognition of the Warsaw Pact or the East German regime).

Gen Norstad believed this system, if placed in operation, would (1) greatly reduce if not eliminate the danger of surprise surface attack; (2) increase to some degree security against surprise air attack; (3) avoid surrender by NATO of its assets in maintaining deterrence and protecting Western Europe; (4) permit only an insignificant increase of Soviet knowledge concerning NATO deployments; (5) help make clear, through inclusion of other countries than Western Germany and through the device of mixed teams, that the plan involved no abandonment of the goal of German unity; and (6) provide, if successfully operated, a basis for further steps in the direction of effective control and reduction of armaments.

(S) Msg, Paris to SecState, 4800, 15 Apr 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 6.

19 Apr 60

Dr. Wolfgang H. Panofsky, Director of the High-Energy Physics Laboratory of Stanford University, stated that under the US threshold proposal of 11 February 1960 at the



Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference (see two items of that date) the chance of a 20-kiloton nondecoupled explosion's being actually subjected to on-site inspection was 10 per cent. The chance of detecting a 50-kiloton explosion for which maximum use had been made of decoupling techniques was virtually zero, Dr. Panofsky added. He made these statements in testimony before two subcommittees of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. (See item of 8 May 1960.)

(U) US, Congress, Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 86th Cong, 2d Sess, 1960, Part I, pp. 79-80.

20 Apr 60

Dr. Edward Teller, Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory of the University of California, testified before two subcommittees of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy that, in his opinion, science had not advanced to the point of providing adequate means of detecting clandestine nuclear tests. To attempt to overcome this limitation simply by erecting a control system with a very large number of stations, he said, would result in the detection of so great a number of events requiring inspection as to overwhelm any conceivable inspection agency. Dr. Teller thought the existing program of research and development was seriously inadequate in fields bearing on detection and inspection controls for a nuclear weapons test ban. He thought there should be a high-priority program not only in seismology and methods of detection but also in methods of evasion. In such programs he favored "as much international co-operation as is possible without obstruction from anyone."

Dr. Hans Bethe, eminent nuclear physicist of Cornell University, agreed with Dr. Teller that the existing program of research and development was inadequate. But Dr. Bethe thought there should be a US program and a concurrent separate program open to participation by other nations, so that the US would not be hampered by foot-dragging tendencies on the part of any of its associates. He was more hopeful than Dr. Teller about the technical possibility of a workable control system with existing means. Such a system would require some 600 stations in the Soviet Union, but the number of on-site inspections necessary, he thought, could be reduced to a manageable figure. Unmanned stations could be used, he said, but a period of at least 1 to 2 years of research would be necessary to learn how to render the stations tamperproof. (See item of 8 May 1960.)

(U) US, Congress, Special Subcommittee on Radiation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, 86th Cong, 2d Sess, 1960, Part I, pp. 165-167, 171-176.

21 Apr 60

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~~(TS-RD)~~ Ltr, CINCSAC to CJCS, "Nuclear Test Moratorium," 21 Apr 60, Encl to ~~(TS-RD)~~ JCS 2179/209, 26 Apr 60, JMF 4513 (21 Apr 60). ~~(C)~~ Msg, JCS 976531 to CINCSAC, 3 May 60, R&RA msg files.

21 Apr 60

The Western nations presented to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference a general description of the machinery to monitor armed forces reduction under disarmament. The proposal would permit international inspection teams to make on-the-spot checks four times annually of the size of armed units and to keep watch on troop movements, inspect transportation hubs, and count ships' companies at home ports. The inspectors would begin operating when an initial ceiling of 2.5 million men had been agreed upon by the US and USSR and would continue to operate during the reduction to 2.1 million men and any further reductions. Other nations would come under this system as soon as these nations agreed to reduce their armed manpower. The plan did not attempt to deal with the more complicated problem of inspecting reductions in conventional weapons.

The Communist bloc objected to this Western proposal for the following reasons: (1) The West wanted to negotiate manpower reductions without agreeing on a plan for total disarmament. (2) The West did not accept the Soviet proposal for an initial reduction by the US and USSR to 1.7 million men. (3) The West did not mention force levels for the UK and France, for whom the USSR had proposed limits of 650,000 men each.

NYT, 22 Apr 60, pp. 1, 6.

25 Apr 60

The Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference reconvened after a 10-day recess.

NYT, 26 Apr 60, p. 18.

25 Apr 60

In an address before a joint session of Congress, President de Gaulle of the French Republic put forth France's recommendation that disarmament begin, but stated that "failing the renunciation of atomic armaments by those states who are provided with them, the French Republic obviously will be obliged to equip itself with such armaments."

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Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (16 May 1960), 773.  
NYT, 26 Apr 1960, p. 18.

26 Apr 60

The five Western nations at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva presented to the conference a "statement on conditions" for disarmament, similar in purpose to the Soviet-bloc document tabled on 11 April (see item). The statement declared that the disarmament process and any agreement finally reached must fulfill the following conditions: disarmament must be carried out in stages and as rapidly as possible, but with no fixed timetable; nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced in the interest of equal security for all countries; disarmament measures must be effectively controlled to ensure full compliance; and disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of their early implementation and effective control. The statement concluded that the final goal of a program of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be to achieve the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and the reduction and limitation of all types of forces and weapons to levels required only for internal security and the fulfillment of obligations under the UN charter.

(The Communist countries did not specifically reject the Western paper, but their reaction offered no encouragement to Western hopes that the conference could turn toward a discussion of specific measures.) (See item of 29 April 1960.)

(U) "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . , Geneva Switzerland, March 15--June 28, 1960," 5 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 14. See also NYT, 27 Apr 60, p. 19.

27 Apr 60

In response to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 19 April 1960, the JCS provided the Secretary of Defense with their views on the "outline form" of Gen Norstad's proposals for a European inspection zone (see item of 15 April 1960).

6) (-) 7 (1)

The JCS considered that the US should not at this stage go beyond the first phase of the proposal, namely, the institution of joint inspection machinery in an agreed zone, with no offer of a reduction or limitation of forces. Whether to make such an offer regarding forces could be considered after a period of successful functioning of the joint inspection machinery. The JCS requested that they be given an opportunity to study and comment on the Norstad proposal after it had been fully developed as a negotiating position. They concluded with the statement that the foregoing comments in no way prejudiced the views submitted in their memorandum dated 12 February 1960 (see item).

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) was advised informally that (1) the JCS views had been framed as they were to avoid putting any roadblock in the way of a political decision to proceed with the Norstad plan, and (2) the JCS would firmly support a Defense position, if adopted, that the plan should not be offered at the Summit

meeting in May; the advantages to be gained would be outweighed by the risk that during the conference discussion it might not be possible to resist expansion of the proposal to include limitations on armaments and forces within the projected European zone.

~~(S)~~ JCSM-179-60 to SecDef, "European Inspection Zone (U)," 27 Apr 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 7, derived from ~~(S)~~ JCS 1731/372, 23 Apr 60, same file; (S) 1st N/H of JCS 1731/372, 6 Jun 60, same file; ~~(S)~~ JCS 1731/369, 20 Apr 60, same file, sec 5.

29 Apr 60

The Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva, having made no progress in its negotiations, recessed in anticipation of the meeting of Heads of Government scheduled for mid-May. (See item of 7 June 1960.)

(U) "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . Geneva, Switzerland, March 15--June 28, 1960," 5 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 14; NYT, 30 Apr 60, pp. 1, 2.

3 May 60 At the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference the USSR accepted the Western proposal that experimental nuclear explosions be carried out as part of an East-West research program on scientific detection methods. In addition, the USSR accepted the Western proposal that any moratorium on underground explosions beneath the detection threshold resulting from the conference be unilaterally declared by the three powers instead of being written into the treaty.

NYT, 4 May 60, pp. 1, 8.

4 May 60 In "A Report to the Public on the Biological Effects of Radiation," the National Science Foundation published its current findings on radiation hazards. According to this report, present levels of man-made radiation were far below those thought necessary to induce genetic mutations. At maximum estimates, the average human being would receive in his reproductive lifetime only about half the amount of radiation believed acceptable.

NYT, 5 May 60, p. 17.

7 May 60 President Eisenhower announced approval of a major expansion of existing research and development directed toward an improved capability to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions. As compared with the approximately \$10 million funded for this purpose in FY 1960, about \$66 million was expected to be required for FY 1961. The program, known as Project VELA, called for increased basic research in seismology, procurement of instruments for a world-wide seismic research program, development of improved seismic instruments, construction and operation of prototype seismic detection stations, and an experimental program of underground tests encompassing both high-explosive and, where necessary, nuclear detonations. The conditions under which nuclear explosions were to be carried out would prevent any radioactive fallout. Government agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Interior, as well as universities and other private organizations, would participate in carrying out the US program of research and development.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (23 May 60), 819. See also NYT, 8 May 60, p. 34.

8 May 60 The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy issued a "summary-analysis" of the hearings held by two of its subcommittees 19-22 April 1960 on technical aspects of detection and inspection controls for a nuclear-weapons-test ban. The witnesses had included such leading scientists as Drs. Edward Teller and Harold Brown of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory of the University of California, Dr. Wolfgang H. Panofsky of Stanford University's High Energy Physics Laboratory, Dr. Carl Romney of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Drs. Albert R. and Richard Latter of the Rand Corporation, and Dr. Hans Bethe of Cornell University.

Despite some wide divergences of opinion among the experts consulted, the two subcommittees had found general agreement on the following: (1) The control system of 180 stations proposed by the 1958 Conference of Experts in Geneva would require augmentation and improvement if it was to be capable of detecting and identifying underground

seismic events to the value of 5 kilotons, as originally estimated. (2) An increase in the number of stations in the Geneva control system for the purpose of lowering the threshold of underground seismic events that it could detect would result in a considerable increase in the number of unidentified events that might require inspection. (3) Use of the decoupling method made it possible to increase the difficulty of detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions by a factor of up to 300. (4) To establish a capability for the Geneva control system to detect and identify underground seismic events of yield equivalent to that of a 20-kiloton fully decoupled explosion, it would be necessary to increase greatly the number of stations and to improve the instruments and techniques of seismic detection. (5) A vigorous and sustained program of research and development was necessary to improve instruments and techniques of detection, identification, and inspection of underground nuclear-explosion tests.

Differences in regard to scientific facts and judgments concerning the following were brought out: (1) The practicality and effect of decoupling by siting explosions in large cavities; (2) the practicality and theoretical limits of further improvement in detection networks and devices; and (3) the possible extent of further weapons development through clandestine tests.

The two subcommittees foresaw that the next several years might be marked by a race between the improvement of means of detection and identification and the improvement of means of concealing and muffling nuclear tests.

(U) US Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Summary-Analysis of Hearings, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection Controls of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, Joint Committee Print, 86th Cong, 2d Sess, May 1960, pp. 4-5, 78.

10 May 60

In response to an oral request on 4 May 1960 from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their views on the quantity of fissionable material that the US might propose at the Summit meeting for transfer to peaceful uses. If it should be decided to express the proposal as a specific amount, they recommended the figure of ~~5~~

~~5~~ they suggested that the US offer to match the USSR, kilogram for kilogram, in any amount of fissionable material to be transferred. The JCS concluded their memorandum with a cautionary repetition of the "three unalterable prerequisites"--already stated in the Western proposals, they noted--on which any agreement to transfer fissionable materials must be contingent: (1) a verified cutoff of production; (2) satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament; and (3) the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system.

~~(S)~~ JCSM-197-60 to SecDef, "Nuclear Disarmament Measures (U)," 10 May 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 8, derived from ~~(S)~~ JCS 1731/377, 9 May 60, same file, sec 7. See also ~~(S)~~ JCS 1731/371, 21 Apr 60, same file, sec 6.

11 May 60

A conference of scientists from the US, the UK, and the USSR convened at Geneva to exchange information and define

the requirements for a research program to improve the capability of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions (see items of 29 March and 14 April 1960). The US seven-member delegation was headed by Frank Press, Director of the Seismological Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. (See item of 31 May 1960.)

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (23 May 60), 819; ibid. (30 May 60), 892-893.

12 May 60

The US submitted to the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference a proposed timetable for the establishment of a control system. (See item of 11 August 1960 for Soviet conditioned acceptance.) The US timetable would have a world-wide control system installed and fully operational 6 years after treaty ratification and would comprise three overlapping phases. The first phase would be completed within 3 years after ratification, with controls fully operative in the USSR, the US and its territories, and the UK. There would be 21 control points in the USSR, 23 in US territory, and 1 in the UK, with each post manned by about 30 technicians. Two of the ships to be fitted out as control posts on the high seas would also be in operation by the end of the first phase. The second stage would start one year after ratification and be completed within 5 years of that date. It would see extension of the system to cover all of the Northern Hemisphere and a small part of the Southern. A final extension to complete the world-wide coverage would occur during the third stage, beginning not later than 3 years after the treaty's ratification and ending not later than 6 years after ratification. (Plenary sessions of the nuclear-test-ban conference were then suspended until 27 May 1960, although the scientific deliberations continued, ending on 30 May 1960.)

NYT, 13 May 60, pp. 1, 5.

12 May 60

The JCS submitted to the Secretary of Defense their views on a French draft proposal of 11 May 1960 that favored a controlled prohibition of use of the means of delivering strategic nuclear weapons, to go into effect during the first stage of a negotiated disarmament. The JCS pointed out that this proposal would eliminate US deterrent capabilities before any controlled reduction of Sino-Soviet conventional capabilities had been accomplished. They recommended, therefore, that the proposal be "unequivocally" rejected and that the US should insist upon adherence to the provisions of the Western disarmament plan of 16 March (see item of 14 March 1960). The JCS noted that the kind of measure the French were advocating might become appropriate during Stage III of the Western plan.

(S) JCSM-203-60 to SecDef, "French Proposal of 11 May 1960 for Control of Means of Delivery for Nuclear Weapons (U)," 12 May 60, derived from (S) JCS 1731/380, 12 May 60; both in JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 8.

16 May 60

During a private Session of the Paris meeting of Heads of Government, President Eisenhower informed Premier Khrushchev that one of his purposes in coming to the Summit meeting had been "to seek agreements with the Soviet Union which would eliminate the necessity for all forms of espionage, including overflights." Among the proposals he had planned to offer, the President said, had been one "for the creation of a United Nations aerial surveillance to detect preparations for attack," but if, because of the Soviet attitude, this matter could not be dealt with at the Summit meeting, he was planning to submit the proposal in the near future to the United Nations. The proposed surveillance system would operate in the territories of all nations prepared to accept such inspection, the President continued. The US was prepared not only to accept UN aerial surveillance but to do everything in its power to contribute to the rapid organization and successful operation of such international surveillance. (See item of 21 May 1960.)

(The Summit conference, at which it was planned that President Eisenhower, Premier Khrushchev, President de Gaulle of France, and British Prime Minister Macmillan would attend, was scheduled to begin in Paris on 16 May. As a consequence of the Soviet capture of a US pilot and the alleged Soviet destruction of his U-2 photo-reconnaissance plane in the Urals on 1 May 1960, Khrushchev denounced President Eisenhower and the US so violently at the private meeting referred to above and made the holding of the Summit conference contingent on satisfaction of such sweeping demands on the US that it become impossible for the conference to take place. On 17 May the three Western Heads of Government issued a joint statement recognizing that there would be no conference and blaming Khrushchev.)

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (6 Jun 60), 904-905; NYT, 17 May 60, pp. 1, 14; ibid., 18 May 60, pp. 1, 14.

20 May 60

The World Health Assembly approved a US-sponsored resolution stating that "until sufficient actual progress towards agreed disarmament under effective international control has been made it would be premature to study the question of the utilization of any resources released thereby," and that international co-operation through the World Health Organization "should not pause in its efforts while waiting for such disarmament." (This resolution was submitted as an alternative to a USSR resolution that would have requested the Director General of WHO "to submit . . . , as soon as agreement has been achieved on general and complete disarmament, proposals for the utilization of any resources released as a result of such an agreement to meet urgent world needs in the field of health . . . .")

Dept of State Bulletin, XLII (20 June 60), 1007.

21 May 60

The JCS provided the Secretary of Defense with their views concerning "Draft Background Paper on a U.S. Proposal for an Aerial Inspection Arrangement, Under Supervision of the United Nations," in response to a request from the Consultant to the Secretary of Defense for Disarmament Affairs. Under the proposal the US and the USSR (with any other countries that might wish to participate) would, as an initial step, make available to the United Nations suitable aircraft, photographic equipment, and crews to conduct aerial inspection of their territory under the



supervision of UN officials, acting under the direction of the Secretary General. Initially, there would be no ground observers. The US would be willing to consider an arrangement under which each participating country's equipment and crews were used for aerial inspection of its own territory, with reciprocal on-board monitors from the US and the USSR. All flights and the processing of photographs would be under UN supervision, with the photographs available at UN headquarters to participating countries on a reciprocal basis. Under the proposal the US would indicate its belief that a US-USSR exchange of blueprints of their military establishments prior to beginning the aerial inspection, as proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955, would make the inspection more effective; but the US would also announce its willingness to proceed with the inspection without such an exchange. The US would express the hope that ultimately the operation might be carried on entirely by an international inspection agency under the UN.

The JCS concurred in the draft paper, subject to only one comment: It should be clearly understood that inspection of major areas of the US would be contingent upon equivalent inspection of Chinese Communist territory, to prevent removal of Soviet missile sites to sanctuary there. (See item of 16 May 1960.)

(S) JCSM-217-60 to SecDef, "United Nations Aerial Surveillance System (U)," 21 May 60, derived from (S) JCS 1731/385, 21 May 60; both in JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 8. See also (S) JCS 1731/334, 20 May 60, same file.

24 May 60

The National Security Council noted the President's approval of the following policy position "in the post-Summit environment":

The United States should continue to seek completion of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing, but should make clear that these negotiations and the U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing cannot go on indefinitely without decision. The United States should determine at what time or at what stage of these negotiations it should seek to place a time limit on their duration.

(See item of 12 August 1960.)

(TS) NSC Action No. 2238, 24 May 60 (approved by President 31 May 60).

27 May 60

The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 19 May 1960, in which their views had been requested concerning the military desirability of prelaunch inspection of missile payloads as a system to monitor a ban on high-altitude nuclear testing. The Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering had also been asked to study the technical feasibility of this measure. The JCS pointed out that inspection of missile payloads would not only provide some information concerning the missile itself, but would also reveal considerable information on warheads. The US, the JCS continued, was estimated to have a significant lead over the Soviets in the field of warhead sophistication and missile-guidance techniques; thus, from a purely intelligence standpoint, prelaunch inspection of missile payloads would not necessarily result in a net advantage to the US. Nevertheless, if the ODDR&E study should

conclude that prelaunch inspection of payloads was necessary to prevent covert high-altitude weapons testing, this measure should be included as a provision of any general nuclear test ban that might be agreed upon. When the time came for US compliance with a test-ban treaty, certainty that Soviet testing had also actually stopped would be vitally important.

(S) JCSM-225-60 to SecDef, "Pre-Launch Inspection of Missile Payloads as a System to Monitor a Ban on High Altitude Nuclear Testing (U)," 27 May 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 10, derived from (S) JCS 1731/386, 27 May 60, same file, sec 8; (S) JCS 1731/382, 20 May 60, same file, sec 8.

27 May 60

Plenary sessions of the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference resumed. The USSR asked for guarantees that data from the nuclear explosions scheduled under the US Project VELA (see item of 7 May 1960) would not be used for weapons development in addition to the announced purpose of seeking improved means of monitoring a nuclear test ban. (See item of 2 June 1960.)

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (26 Sep 60), 493;  
NYT, 28 May 60, pp. 1, 6.

31 May 60

Of 12 atomic tests planned for Project VELA, the Soviet delegation at the East-West meeting of scientists in Geneva (see item of 11 May 1960) objected to 7. Five of the 7, concerned with decoupling theory, incurred Soviet disapproval on the ground that the Soviet people would not understand any work that seemed to be aimed at developing ways of circumventing the test ban. The other 2 experiments, involving the use of "baby bombs," were objectionable to the Soviets because of an alleged relationship to US plans for developing small tactical atomic weapons.

NYT, 1 Jun 60, pp. 1, 9.

2 Jun 60

At the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference the US offered the following safeguards to reassure the Soviets in regard to the uses to which data from the Project VELA test series would be put (see item of 27 May 1960): (1) All the nuclear devices would be of previously tested design; no untried type of bomb would be employed. (2) All the bombs to be detonated would be deposited under international surveillance, with Soviet representation, at an early date. (3) Soviet experts would be permitted to observe at the detonation and the seismic recording stations, and to use their own measuring instruments. (4) No "diagnostic" measurements of the type required for arms development purposes would be made.

In reply, the Soviet delegate stated that the USSR would be satisfied only if it had full-partnership rights in this testing program, including the right to look inside the nuclear devices to be detonated.

The Soviet delegate also indicated that there would not be any seismic-research program in the USSR with either nuclear or conventional explosives. (This pronouncement contradicted the statements of the Soviet scientists at the May 1960 scientists' conference; these scientists had stated that the USSR planned a series of conventional tests and 40 seismic stations to measure the blasts. The Soviet scientists had stated, moreover, that the Soviet Government had already allotted 20,000 tons of chemical explosives for this program, which was to extend from 1960 to 1963. The Soviet delegate's explanation for this turnabout was simply that the Soviet scientists had not been speaking for their government. US Delegate Wadsworth characterized the move as a Soviet retreat from the illogical position of simultaneously conducting research and maintaining that the 1958 experts' findings were adequate.)

NYT, 3 June 60, pp. 1, 7; ibid., 4 June 60, 7.

2 Jun 60

The UN made public the text of a Soviet total-disarmament proposal received by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold the same date. In the proposal the Soviet Government noted that during negotiations subsequent to its total-disarmament proposal of 18 September 1959 "some powers, among them France," had "expressed the view that disarmament should begin with the prohibition and destruction of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, such as military rockets, military aircraft, warships and the like, due regard being had to the need for the simultaneous liquidation by states of such military bases as they may possess in foreign territories." Though the Soviet Government still believed the sequence of disarmament measures it had proposed on 18 September 1959 was best, its desire to facilitate agreement made the Soviet Government ready to meet the Western Powers halfway and agree on a different sequence if this different sequence was more acceptable to the Western Powers. (In making the new proposal, which was referred to as "a development of the program put forward on 18 September 1959," the Soviet Government did not repeat the time limit of 4 years for the completion of disarmament or refer to it. Only one specific reference was made to a time schedule: 1 year to 18 months, "approximately," for carrying out the first-stage measures. The proposal's general statement of purpose and the provisions for a control organization were similar to those of the 18 September 1959 proposal.) The new proposal arranged the

measures of the three stages as follows:

First stage: (1) Nuclear weapons to be eliminated from the arsenals of states, their manufacture to be discontinued, and all means of delivering such weapons to be destroyed. (2) All foreign troops to be withdrawn from the territories of other states to within their own national boundaries; foreign military bases and stores of all kinds, both those released after troop withdrawals and those held in reserve, to be eliminated. (3) Until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, the launching into orbit or the placing in outer space of special devices, the penetration of warships beyond the limits of territorial waters, and the flight beyond the limits of their national territory of military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction to be prohibited. (4) Rockets to be launched exclusively for peaceful purposes in accordance with predetermined and agreed criteria and subject to agreed verification measures, including on-the-spot inspection of the launching sites. (5) States possessing nuclear weapons to undertake not to transmit such weapons or information necessary for their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons; states not possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from manufacturing them. (6) States to make corresponding reductions in military expenditures. (7) International control measures for carrying out preceding provisions to be established. These measures would include international supervision of (a) destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, (b) abolition of foreign military bases, (c) withdrawal to national territory of foreign-based troops, and (d) airports and harbors, to ensure their being used only for peaceful purposes. (8) A joint study to be made of measures for cutting off the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and destroying stockpiles of such weapons. (9) After 1 year to 18 months, by which time the first-stage measures were to be completed, the International Control Organization to ascertain to what extent the measures had been carried out, with a view to reporting thereon to states parties to the treaty and also to the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

Second stage: (1) Complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction; cutoff of production, and destruction of all stockpiles, of weapons of these types. (2) Reduction of the armed forces of all states to agreed levels, those of the US and USSR being reduced to not more than 1,700,000 men; conventional weapons and ammunition thus released to be destroyed, and the military equipment to be destroyed or used for peaceful uses; military expenditures of states to be reduced correspondingly. (3) International control measures for carrying out the preceding provisions to be established. These measures would include international supervision of the disbanding of troops and the destruction of armaments, control-organization inspection of all undertakings extracting atomic raw materials or producing or using atomic materials or atomic energy, and free access by the control organization to all material relating to the budgetary allocations of states for military purposes. (4) Joint studies to be undertaken on the following (for carrying out in the third stage): (a) Measures to insure continued compliance with the treaty after completion of the measures in the treaty;

(b) measures to maintain peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the UN under conditions of general disarmament. (5) "As upon the transition from the first to the second stage," the International Control Organization to ascertain to what extent the second-stage measures had been carried out, with a view to making reports therein similar to its reports on the carrying out of the first-stage measures.

Third stage: (1) Completion of disbandment of the armed forces of all states; only a "strictly limited" contingent of police (militia) to be retained by each country, of an agreed size and equipped with small arms, to maintain internal order. (2) All remaining types of conventional armaments, ammunition, and military equipment to be destroyed or used for peaceful purposes. (3) Military production to be "wound up" at all factories, including a cutoff in production of conventional armaments except a strictly limited output of small arms for the police (militia). (4) War ministries, general staffs, and all military and paramilitary establishments and organizations to be abolished; all military courses for reservists to be terminated; military education for young people to be prohibited and military service in any form to be abolished. (5) Appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, public or private, to be discontinued; funds made available through implementation of general disarmament to be used for reduction or abolition of taxation, to subsidize national economies, and to furnish economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. (6) The International Control Organization to send its officers to verify on the spot the carrying out of the above third-stage measures; as necessary, the control organization to institute a system of aerial observation and aerial photography over the territories of states. (7) After completion of the program of disarmament, the control organization to exercise permanent surveillance over fulfillment by states of the obligations assumed by them. (8) The further measures worked out to ensure compliance with the treaty on complete disarmament to take effect. (9) Measures to maintain peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter to be carried out; states to place at the disposal of the UN Security Council, as necessary, formations from their contingents of police (militia). (See item of 7 June 1960.)

NYT, 3 Jun 60, pp. 1, 6 (text of proposal on p. 6).

7 Jun 60

The JCS responded to a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated 19 May 1960, that requested them to submit their views with regard to implementing the President's 16 May 1960 statement concerning a United Nations aerial surveillance system (see item). They noted that the current State Department proposal represented the following changes in US policy (see item of 21 May 1960): (1) UN control; (2) initially, no exchange of blueprints of military establishments; (3) initially, no ground observers; (4) the suggestion that initially nations might perform aerial surveillance of their own territories. Though such an agreement with the Soviet Union would not minimize the possibility of a surprise attack, they said, they considered it extremely desirable from the military point of view to obtain controlled aerial surveillance of the USSR and Communist China for

the following reasons: (1) to provide a more accurate estimate of Soviet capabilities; (2) to make the mounting of a surprise attack more difficult; (3) to provide effective intelligence on the Soviet Union not already available, including especially valuable geodetic data for US targeting.

In response to specific questions posed in the Acting Secretary's memorandum, the JCS forwarded a detailed technical report ("Report on United Nations Aerial Surveillance System, 25 May 1960"). Key items of the report were: (1) The US possessed adequate capability to provide the UN with an aerial surveillance system. (2) A mixed force of U-2's and RB-47's was recommended. (3) Of four different arrangements treated, the JCS recommended the one under which national forces would remain assigned to their parent nations and the US would fly aerial surveillance over the USSR, and vice versa. Direct UN supervision of all flight operations and UN control of the film would be mandatory. (4) The technical advantage of an airborne observer from the country being overflown would be negligible if the UN controlled the film, but such an observer would be required under some of the alternative arrangements referred to in (3) because of linguistic problems associated with flying safety, and in one of the arrangements such an observer could provide some measure of UN supervision to counter possible Soviet obstructionist tactics. (5) Techniques adaptable in the future to aerial inspection of large areas were discussed.

In conclusion the JCS offered the following comments, which they believed would warrant serious consideration: (1) The initiation of only an aerial surveillance system might have the adverse effect of fostering a world-wide false sense of security from surprise attack. (2) On the other hand, such a system under the UN, with the USSR participating, would form the basis for proceeding to the "more definitive factors" required for an adequate inspection system to support disarmament; among these would be the exchange of military blueprints and the stationing of ground observers to verify the aerial surveillance. (3) In considering the requirement to balance areas of the USSR and Communist China against equivalent areas of the US, the implication of UN surveillance of Communist China would require further study.

On 13 June 1960 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded the above-mentioned JCS technical report to the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, Department of State, for possible use in developing a US proposal to the UN. He called special attention to the above-mentioned concluding comments in the JCS memorandum by quoting them verbatim.

~~(S)~~ JCSM-235-60 to SecDef, "United Nations Aerial Surveillance System (U)," 7 Jun 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 11, derived from ~~(S)~~ JCS 1731/387, 25 May 60, 25 May 60, same file, sec 9; ~~(S)~~ 1st N/H of JCS 1731/387, 17 Jun 60, same file, sec 9.

7 Jun 60

As the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference resumed sessions following the recess begun on 29 April, the Soviet delegation formally submitted its revamped total-disarmament plan made public on 2 June (see that item; see also item of 23 June 1960.)

(U) "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . Geneva, Switzerland, March 15--June 28, 1960," 5 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 14.

10 Jun 60

Replying to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) dated 8 June 1960, the JCS transmitted to the Secretary of Defense their views on the Soviet disarmament proposal of 2 June 1960 (see item). They found this proposal "completely unacceptable" for the following reasons: (1) If adopted, the proposal would dismantle the US nuclear capability, including the foreign-base structure essential to US forward strategy, before any controlled reduction of Sino-Soviet conventional capability had been accomplished. (2) Since control functions throughout the disarmament process would, under the Soviet proposal, be carried on essentially at declared plants and sites only, with no inspection for clandestine activities, there would be no assurance that even the nuclear capability of the Soviets had been nullified. (3) The proposal failed to remedy the shortcomings of past Soviet proposals in such areas as control, preliminary studies, phasing, and postdisarmament peace keeping. In their opinion, the JCS said, the Soviet proposal was just another effort to further the Sino-Soviet objective of disrupting the free-world alliances, disintegrating the collective defenses of the non-Communist nations, and frustrating the US forward strategy. The Soviets were exploiting a propaganda opening created by an instance of Western disunity--the French proposal to control the means of delivering nuclear weapons (see item of 12 May 1960). Though the JCS did not want to prejudge any changes the Western allies might wish to make in the Western disarmament plan of 16 March 1960 (see item of 14 March 1960), the JCS believed that the US should adhere to the principles, conditions, and time phasing of that plan and that the US should strongly insist on allied unity in the future. The Western position must not, they urged, be allowed to erode in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference as it had done in the nuclear-test-ban talks, in which, through the moratorium, the US had in effect acceded to the Soviet demand for a cessation of nuclear testing without any assurance that the Soviets themselves had in fact also ceased.

On 16 June 1960 the Secretary of Defense forwarded a copy of the foregoing JCS views to the Secretary of State. Stating his general agreement with the JCS, the Secretary endorsed in particular their conclusion concerning the motivation behind the Soviet proposal. He added that he considered the agreed Western position to be fundamentally sound and that the US should not agree to any substantive departure from it, despite pressure from the allied nations.

(S) JCSM-250-60 to SecDef, "Soviet Disarmament Proposal of 2 June 1960 (U)," 10 Jun 60, derived from (S) JCS 1731/392, 9 Jun 60; (S) 1st N/H of JCS 1731/392, 21 Jun 60; (U) JCS 1731/391, 8 Jun 60. All in JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 11.

10 Jun 60

The Western nations at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference, speaking through US delegate Fredrick M. Eaton, gave their first formal response to the Soviet disarmament plan of 2 June 1960 (see item). The West saw the following hopeful signs in the Soviet proposal: (1) The new plan went into details on the problems of controls and inspection. (2) The new plan included for the first time a provision for the study of the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use. (3) The plan abandoned insistence upon a four-year timetable.

(4) The plan recognized the principle of a peace-keeping force in a disarmed world.

The West also found faults in the Soviet plan: (1) The plan called for acceptance of a complete disarmament plan before any disarmament step was taken. (2) The elimination of all methods of delivery of nuclear weapons and the elimination of foreign bases prior to the elimination of conventional forces would result in military imbalance.

Soviet delegate Zorin replied that if the West wanted conventional disarmament first, the USSR would "gladly" listen to proposals.

NYT, 11 June 60, p. 4.

13 Jun 60 The JCS replied to a memorandum dated 26 January 1960 in which the Deputy Secretary of Defense had requested their comments concerning the draft treaty under consideration by the Geneva conference on discontinuing nuclear weapons tests. (This draft treaty currently consisted of a preamble, 24 articles, and 3 annexes, of which the preamble, 17 articles, and 1 annex had been agreed upon at the conference.) The JCS views had been solicited with particular reference to (1) the inspection and control aspects of the draft treaty, (2) the estimated cost of installing and operating the control system called for, and (3) the implications of the treaty, if approved, for US national security. On (1), citing testimony of the nuclear scientists Edward Teller and Hans Bethe before Congress on 20 April 1960 (see item), the JCS commented that technology had not yet provided a reliable system for detecting and identifying all types and magnitudes of nuclear detonations within the earth's atmosphere, much less in outer space; therefore, they said, the inspection and control system envisioned by the proposed treaty should be critically and formally re-examined by scientific experts, both nationally and internationally, to determine its adequacy. Concerning (2), the JCS stated that the variables involved made a good estimate of the cost of installing and operating the control system impossible, but the cost would be very high. For example, they said, the Air Force Technical Application Center's estimate of \$1,643,545,756 as the cost of installing and operating for 1 year the control system recommended by the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts (see item of 21 August 1958) was reasonable; but the addition to that system of outer-space-satellite capability for detecting high-altitude explosions, plus the requirements imposed in developing a lower detection threshold, would raise the system's cost to an amount greatly in excess of the AFTAC estimate. Some had suggested that the number of control posts would have to be increased by a factor of 5, which would raise the cost to over \$8 billion. In regard to (3)--the implications of the treaty, if approved, for US national security--the JCS took a grave view. The treaty did not contain adequate safeguards, they said, and thus its adoption would establish a dangerous precedent for the Ten-Nation negotiations. They commented that the "historical" US position of insisting on adequate safeguards (as required by basic national security policy) appeared to be deteriorating in the interest of reaching agreement. A case in point was the offer to announce a unilateral moratorium on tests below the threshold after the treaty was signed but before its ratification and effective date (see item of 29 March 1960). Though



the decision to announce this offer had been primarily political, the JCS pointed out, this in no way removed the technical difficulties of developing an effective control and inspection system in high-altitude and underground environments; and though the announcement had already been made public, the JCS believed a technical analysis and experimental verification of the effectiveness of the treaty's proposed control and inspection system should be made and the results evaluated before any moratorium was actually declared. The frustration of the UN truce team in Korea had demonstrated the danger of relying on Communist good faith. Reliance on only the good faith of the Soviets to ensure they were not surreptitiously testing during a prolonged moratorium could result in their altering the existing ratio of military power in their favor.

On 18 July 1960 the Secretary of Defense forwarded the foregoing comments of the JCS to the Secretary of State as worthy of the attention of the disarmament principals concerned with the problem commented on. The Secretary of State replied on 27 July, stating that he would bear these thoughts in mind in the formulation of future policy concerned with the nuclear-test-ban negotiations.

(S) JCSM-236-60 to SecDef, "Draft Treaty on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U)," 13 Jun 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 12, derived from (S) JCS 1731/389, 31 May 60, same file, sec 10; (S) 1st N/H of 1731/389, 20 Jul 60, ibid.; (S) 2d N/H of 1731/389, 3 Aug 60, ibid.; (U) JCS 1731/331, 1 Feb 60.

14 Jun 60 At the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference, the US formally invited the USSR to send scientific observers to witness a nonnuclear underground explosion in Nevada during July. (On 27 June 1960 the USSR rejected this invitation.)  
 NYT, 15 Jun 60, p. 19; ibid., 23 Jun 60, p. 10.

17 Jun 60 The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 16 June 1960, in which they had been asked for an appraisal of the US military capabilities in the Far East under the following two sets of circumstances postulated by the Secretary of State: (1) Agreed implementation of the first-stage disarmament measures contained in the Soviet proposal of 2 June 1960 (see item); (2) near agreement on the Soviet first-stage disarmament measures, resulting in inspection and control of nuclear delivery means to the extent of preventing maintenance of a ready posture.

(S) (-) (U)

In summary, the JCS considered that US military capabilities would be so seriously degraded under either postulated set of circumstances as to expose US security interests to an unacceptable threat, not only in the Far East, but also world-wide.

On 29 June 1960 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded the foregoing JCS views to the Secretary of State.

(S) JCSM-260-60 to SecDef, "Appraisal of U.S. Military Capability in the Far East (U)," 17 Jun 60, derived from (S) JCS 1731/396, 17 Jun 60; (S) 1st N/H of JCS 1731/395; (S) JCS 1731/395, 16 Jun 60. All in JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 12.

22 Jun 60

The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 June 1960, in which their comments had been requested regarding a revised proposal to be tabled at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in place of the Western proposal of 16 March 1960 (see item of 14 March 1960). The JCS stated that they considered the proposal militarily acceptable. In order for it to stay militarily acceptable after any future revisions, they continued, such revisions would have to be in accordance with the proposal's "Controlling Principles" and, in addition, with the essentials of its phasing provisions, which the JCS set forth in detail. The JCS also made, among others, the following points: (1) The term "all militarily significant states" should be construed to include Communist China as well as the rest of the Sino-Soviet bloc. (2) It was of "critical importance" to the security of the US that those "early studies" called for in the proposal looking toward "reduction and elimination of agreed categories of nuclear delivery systems" should not in fact lead to agreements on that subject in advance of stage 2; though great pressures could be expected to develop, the US must not prematurely dismantle its deterrent. (3) The proposal did not make transfer of fissionable material from past production contingent upon a verified cutoff of production; the JCS considered that transfers of fissionable material should not take place until three "unalterable" pre-requisites had been satisfied: a verified production cutoff, satisfactory progress in conventional disarmament, and an effective system in operation for verifying both the production cutoff and the transfer from past production. (See item of 27 June for provisions of the proposal commented on above by the JCS; the version of 27 June was virtually the same as that referred for comment to the JCS.)

(S) JCSM-264-60 to SecDef, "Revised U.S. Proposal for Tabling at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference (U)," 22 Jun 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 13, derived from (S) JCS 1731/400, 22 Jun 60, ibid.; (S) JCS 1731/399, 21 Jun 60, same file, sec 12.

23 Jun 60

The JCS transmitted to the Secretary of Defense their views on the future status of the Eniwetok Proving Ground

(EPG) and of Joint Task Force Seven (JTF-7), whose mission was concerned with nuclear testing. The JCS agreed with action being taken under the Deputy Secretary of Defense's memorandum of 22 January 1960 (see item) to transfer the EPG and JTF-7 responsibilities associated therewith to the Pacific Missile Range (PMR), effective 1 July 1960, and to reduce JTF-7 accordingly. The JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve the eventual disestablishment of JTF-7 by phases, and also that the Secretary approve the principle that the EPG, after passing to PMR control, should not be modified in any way that would preclude future nuclear weapons tests.

The Acting Secretary of Defense notified the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 September 1960 that disestablishment of JTF-7 by phases had been approved, to be carried out as expeditiously as was practical. As to modifications that the PMR might wish to make in the Eniwetok Proving Ground, the Secretary stated that none would be made that might be incompatible with the resumption of atmospheric or underwater testing of high-yield weapons unless he himself had given prior approval.

(S) JCSM-263-60 to SecDef, "Future Status of Joint Task Force Seven and Eniwetok Proving Ground (U)," 23 Jun 60, derived from (S) JCS 2179/217, 15 Jun 60. Both in JMF 4613 (7 Apr 60) sec 1. (S) Memo, Acting SecDef to CJCS, same subj, 15 Sep 60, Encl to (S) JCS 2179/225, 26 Sep 60, same file, sec 2.

23 Jun 60 New York Times correspondent Dana Adams Schmidt reported from Washington that US disarmament delegate Fredrick M. Eaton, having been recalled from Geneva on 17 June for consultation, was returning to Geneva with instructions to seek agreement on instituting joint East-West studies of the following: (1) The means of establishing and enforcing a ban on space vehicles orbiting the earth with nuclear weapons; (2) a ceiling on military force levels; (3) a cut-off of production of nuclear weapons and a ban on production of bacteriological weapons; (4) an organization for international control and inspection of disarmament measures; and (5) an international peace-keeping machinery to preserve order after the last stages of national disarmament. (See item of 27 June 1960.)  
NYT, 18 Jun 60, pp. 1, 6; ibid., 24 Jun 60, pp. 1, 2.

27 Jun 60 The Soviet-bloc delegations withdrew from the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva. This walkout occurred with full knowledge on the part of Soviet Representative Zorin that the US delegation intended to table a new paper as a result of the deliberations in which Mr. Eaton had just participated in Washington (see item of 23 June 1960). The Polish representative had been chairman of this meeting of 27 June, and, after recognizing only Communist speakers, he had illegally attempted to declare the meeting and conference ended. Upon the departure of the Communist-bloc representatives, the UK representative took the chair. The US then tabled its new proposals (see next item). Because of lack of time for the other Western delegations to consult their governments fully, the new proposals could not be presented as a five-power document. (See item of 28 June 1960.)

(U) "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . , Geneva, Switzerland, March 15--June 28, 1960," 5 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 14.

27 Jun 60

The US tabled its new disarmament proposals at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva, after the walkout of the Communist delegations (see previous item). The proposals took the form of a "Program for General and Complete Disarmament Under Effective International Control." The Introduction of the program listed four essential requirements for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. These were, in brief, (1) the progressive disbanding of all armed forces of all states, (2) the cessation of the production of all kinds of armaments, (3) the strict and effective international control of the implementation of all disarmament measures, and (4) the establishment of effective means for enforcing international agreements and for maintaining peace.

Following the Introduction were seven "controlling principles." These were a development and elaboration of the "statement on conditions" submitted by the US delegation to the Conference on 26 April 1960 (see item), but differed from the earlier document in one important respect. Whereas the statement of 26 April had held that there should be no fixed timetable for carrying out disarmament, the second controlling principle of the 27 June document called for each of the phased disarmament measures to be completed within "an agreed and strictly defined period of time." The seven "controlling principles" follow:

1. Disarmament under effective international control shall be carried out in such a manner that at no time shall any State, whether or not a party to a treaty, obtain military advantage over other States as a result of the progress of disarmament.

2. General and complete disarmament shall proceed through three stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed and strictly defined period of time, under supervision of an international disarmament control organization, within the framework of the United Nations.

3. Each measure within each stage shall be initiated simultaneously by all participating States upon completion of the necessary preparatory studies and upon establishment of the arrangements and procedures necessary for the International Disarmament Control Organization to verify the measure on an initial and continuing basis.

4. Transition from one stage to the next shall be initiated when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that all measures in the preceding stage have been fully implemented and effective verification is continuing, and that any additional verification arrangements and procedures required for measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively.

5. The treaties shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations thereunder if the provisions of the treaty, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.

6. The International Disarmament Control Organization shall comprise all participating States whose representatives shall meet as a conference periodically as required. There shall in addition be a control

commission and a director general. The specific responsibility and authority of the conference, control commission and the director general, the staffing arrangements and criteria, the responsibilities of participating States to the organization, and provisions for any necessary preparatory or interim group to aid in the establishment of the organization shall be specified in the treaty.

7. The specific arrangements, procedures and means required for effective initial and continuing verification of satisfactory performance of each measure by the International Disarmament Control Organization shall be specified in the treaties. These shall provide for all necessary means required for effective verification of compliance with each step of each measure. Verification of each agreed disarmament measure shall be accomplished in such a manner as to be capable of disclosing, to the satisfaction of all participating States, any evasion of the agreement. Specifically, from the initiation of implementation of each agreed disarmament measure, there shall be effective verification by the International Disarmament Control Organization; verification shall be in no way dependent upon declarations by States for its effectiveness; verification shall include the capability to ascertain that not only do reductions of armed forces and armaments in agreed amounts take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage. After detailing the seven "controlling principles," the program addressed itself to the "Task of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament." As envisioned by the US, the task of the committee was to:

1. Negotiate and agree upon a Treaty, to be acceded to in the first instance by the States represented on the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee, embodying the first stage of the program . . . . .
2. In the course of negotiating such a Treaty, arrange for and conduct the necessary technical studies to work out effective control arrangements for measures to be carried out in the program . . . . .
3. After reaching agreement on a Treaty on the first stage of the program, prepare for submission to a world disarmament conference an agreed draft Treaty on the second and third stages of the program . . . . .
4. Thereupon, arrange for a world-wide conference of all States, to be held at the earliest possible time, for the following purposes:
  - a. Accession to the Treaty covering stage one by States which have not already done so;
  - b. Accession to the Treaty covering stages two and three by all States.

The program advanced by the US called for disarmament in three stages:

STAGE ONE

1. An International Disarmament Control Organization shall be established within the framework of the United Nations, and expanded as required by the progressive implementation of general and complete disarmament.

2. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons capable of mass destruction shall be prohibited.

3. To give greater protection against surprise attack, (a) prior notification to the International Disarmament Control Organization of all proposed launchings of space vehicles and missiles and their planned tracks; (b) the establishment of a zone of aerial and ground inspection in agreed areas including the U.S. and U.S.S.R.; (c) exchange of observers on a reciprocal basis at agreed military bases, domestic and foreign.

4. Declaration of and institution of on-site inspection at mutually agreed operational air bases, missile launching pads, submarine and naval bases in order to establish a basis for controls over nuclear delivery systems in subsequent stages.

5. Initial force level ceilings shall be established as follows: 2.5 million for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and agreed appropriate force levels for certain other States. After the accession to the Treaty of other militarily significant States and after these initial force levels have been verified, force levels of 2.1 million shall be established for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and agreed appropriate force levels shall be established for other militarily significant States.

6. Agreed types and quantities of armaments in agreed relation to the established force levels shall be placed in storage depots by participating States within their own territories, under supervision by the International Disarmament Control Organization pending their final destruction or conversion to peaceful uses.

7. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped upon installation and effective operation of the control system found necessary to verify this step by prior technical study and agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons uses, including stockpiling for peaceful purposes, conditioned upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament.

8. The submission by the various States to the International Disarmament Control Organization of data relating to: the operation of their financial system as it affects military expenditures, the amount of their military expenditures, and the percentage of their gross national product earmarked for military expenditures. The data to be submitted will be drawn up in accordance with predetermined and mutually agreed criteria.

#### STAGE TWO

1. Force levels shall be further reduced to 1.7 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to agreed appropriate levels for other States.

2. Quantities of all kinds of armaments of each State, including nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction in existence and all means for their delivery, shall be reduced to agreed levels and the resulting excesses shall be

destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Agreed categories of missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery designed to deliver nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction shall be included in this measure.

3. Expenditures for military purposes shall be reduced in amounts bearing a relation to the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.

4. An international peace force, within the United Nations, shall be progressively established and maintained with agreed personnel strength and armaments sufficient to preserve world peace when general and complete disarmament is achieved.

STAGE THREE

1. Forces and military establishments of all States shall be finally reduced to those levels required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and of providing agreed contingents of forces to the international peace force.

2. The international peace force and remaining agreed contingents of national armed forces shall be armed only with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other remaining armaments, including weapons of mass destruction and vehicles for their delivery and conventional armaments shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

3. Expenditures for military purposes by all States shall be further reduced in amounts bearing a relation to the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.

4. There shall be no manufacture of any armaments except for agreed types and quantities for use by the international peace force and agreed remaining national contingents.

Following completion of Stage Three, the program for general and complete disarmament shall continue to be adhered to and verified.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (18 Jul 60), 90-91; (U) Tab O to (S) JCS 1731/407 (Report on Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . ), 12 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 15.

✓ 28 Jun 60

The Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva held its last meeting, with the Communist-bloc delegations refusing to reconsider their withdrawal of the previous day and attend the meeting. (See item of 22 July 1960.)

(U) "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . . , Geneva, Switzerland, March 15-- June 28, 1960," 5 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 14.

✓ 30 Jun 60

The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 19 May 1960, in which their views were requested concerning a State Department position paper on "Outer Space: Reconnaissance Satellites," dated 9 May 1960. The JCS considered the following two points in the paper acceptable: (1) The US should make it clear that it does not consider international agreement necessary for the use of observation satellites in such peaceful applications as advancement

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of scientific knowledge of the earth, weather reporting, mapping of remote areas, resources surveys, warning of imminence of hostilities, very early warning of ballistic-missile attack, and arms control. (2) The importance of openness in dealings between East and West should be emphasized, and the inevitable role of satellites in creating conditions of openness should be welcomed as a constructive step toward establishing a basis of mutual confidence. If the Soviets were concerned "that this new technology will alter this country's exclusively peaceful intentions," the US was prepared to meet this concern by promptly working out safeguards against surprise attack at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference.

The JCS considered unacceptable the statement in the position paper that the US was prepared to seek jointly with other nations the means of ensuring the greatest international benefit from the use of observation satellites in the service of world peace. It would be premature, they said, to propose consideration of international operation or sharing of outer-space capabilities, for the following reasons: (1) "US Policy on Outer Space" (NSC 5918) called for certain pertinent studies that had not yet been accomplished; (2) US reconnaissance and other observation satellites were still in the research and development stage; hence any discussion of them in the international context would in effect be offering an unproved system; (3) there was no assurance that US satellite systems, after becoming operational, could be operated as effectively by an international body as by the US; (4) making US capabilities in this field available to an international body could nullify the opportunity otherwise available through advancing technology to redress current critical intelligence disadvantages of the free world vis-a-vis the Communist bloc.

(S) JCSM-271-60 to SecDef, "State Department Position Paper, 'Outer Space: Reconnaissance Satellites' (U)," 20 Jun 60, JMF (1 Jan 60) sec 13, derived from (S) JCS 1731/397, 21 Jun 60, same file, sec 12; (S) JCS 1731/383, 20 May 60, same file, sec 8.



✓ 1 Jul 60

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The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 3 June 1960, in which the JCS were requested to make a study of the communications system for the control organization contemplated by the proposed treaty for discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests (see item of 13 June 1960). The Assistant Secretary had requested that the JCS study treat training, materiel, and personnel considerations; cost estimates relationship of the system to national systems, organization for communications, and the need, if any, for changes in the pertinent language of the treaty.

In their reply the JCS proposed an organization capable of phased activation, with main staff functions concentrated at the headquarters in Vienna, Austria, and at regional offices. Qualified personnel to operate the system would not be available, they said, from the military forces of treaty nations, nor would such personnel be immediately available from industry, since much of the employment would be in remote areas of the world; therefore the desired personnel would have to be actively recruited and offered substantial financial incentive. Comprehensive and detailed training, both formal and on the job, would be required at all levels, and the anticipatable personnel turnover would necessitate a continuing formal training program. The JCS estimated that 2,405 persons would be needed to implement Phase I of the treaty; 7,948 persons, the complete world-wide communications system. They recommended the maximum employment of standardized equipment and electronic components, available in a number of countries in the quantity and quality required. A comprehensive engineering study and detailed site survey, to include transmission-path tests, would be required in each region prior to system layout and contract negotiation. The cost of activating Phase I of the treaty, including 1 year's operation, was estimated to be \$90,102,000. The cost for the complete world-wide communications system, including 1 year's operation, was estimated to be \$288,159,220. These cost estimates did not include communications satellites. The JCS recommended that the international system avoid use of the host nation's military communication systems, making use instead of existing civil-type common-carrier systems open to public correspondence, when these systems met required standards. The proposed system would require radio-frequency support by host countries, and this requirement should be included in any agreed treaty. The language of the treaty should also be amended to include a specific obligation on all signatories to respect the integrity of the communications system.

On 19 July 1960 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded a copy of the foregoing JCS comments and estimates to the Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, Department of State, recommending amendment of the draft treaty as suggested by the JCS to bind signatories to preserve the integrity of the communications system. (See item of 6 December 1960.)

JCSM-274-60 to SecDef, "A Communications System for the Proposed Control Organization to Administer the Proposed Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U)," 1 Jul 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 13, derived from JCS 2179/218, 23 Jun 60,

ibid; (c) 1st N/H of JCS 2179/218, 22 Jul 60, ibid.;  
~~(c)~~ JCS 2179/216, 7 Jul 60, same file, sec 11.

5 Jul 60

At the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference, the USSR accepted a UK proposal that insured political parity among the top administrators of the proposed international control commission. Under the UK proposal, the chief administrator and his principal deputy would be neutral, while two nominees each from East and West would fill the four other top-echelon positions.

On the following day, the US gave its approval to the UK plan.

NYT, 6 Jul 60, p. 5; 7 Jul 60, p. 3.

12 Jul 60

At the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference the US, seeking to break a deadlock on methods of carrying out seismic-research programs, proposed the creation of a pool of Western and Soviet nuclear devices, open for inspection and use by both sides. (See item of 2 August 1960.)

NYT, 13 Jul 60, pp. 1, 11.

13 Jul 60

In an attempt to speed negotiations at the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference, the US advanced proposals that for the first time officially accepted the idea of a fixed number of inspections for the parties to the treaty. The US proposals left unspecified, however, the number of inspections to be carried out on the territories of the US, the UK, and the USSR. Under the proposals the USSR would have the right to demand and get an immediate inspection on the soil of the US or UK so long as the demand was within such quota as might be agreed upon, and the two Western nations would have the same right vis-a-vis the USSR.

The US proposals outlined a procedure for determining the number of inspections to be carried out on the territories of nations other than the three original signatories if such nations should later sign the treaty. Initially, each nation other than the original three would have to agree to permit one inspection a year for each 500,000 square kilometers (about 193,000 square miles) of territory, with a minimum of two inspections. As the control commission gained experience based on the number of seismic events not identifiable by the control-system instruments, it would fix specific inspection quotas for these countries, but never fewer than two per year. The administrator of the control network would be required to notify all parties of suspicious tremors within 48 hours. Any party to the treaty would have the right to demand an inspection in a country other than the original three as long as the quota for the country concerned was not exhausted, and the control commission would have to decide on such a demand within 48 hours.

The Soviet delegation made no reply to the US proposals. (See item of 26 July 1960.)

NYT, 14 Jul 60, p. 9.

19 Jul 60

The Soviet delegate to the nuclear-test-ban conference, speaking unofficially in Geneva, rejected the US-proposed safeguards designed to provide assurance that underground nuclear tests for seismic research would be devoid of military value (see item of 2 June 1960). The Soviet delegate also contended that since the USSR

was satisfied with the 1958 experts' findings (see item of 21 August 1958), it saw no reason to join the Western nations in pooling atomic weapons for tests that were not necessary. When pressed during the formal session the next day, however, the Soviet delegate refused to place these remarks on record before the conference.

NYT, 20 Jul 60, pp. 1, 3; ibid., 21 Jul 60, pp. 1, 3.

✓ 19 Jul 60

The USSR delivered to the US Embassy in Moscow a note warning "in a most serious manner" of the dangers of the proposed provision to West Germany of US POLARIS missiles. Citing the German-American negotiations concerned with these missiles and alleging that the US position at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference had led to the breakup of that conference (see item of 27 June 60), the Soviets charged that the US "did not wish to proceed to any kind of effective measures in the field of disarmament because all its actions were directed towards a completely opposite goal--the accumulation by all means of armaments not only in the United States itself, but also in countries bound to it by military pacts." (See item of 8 August 1960.)

Dept. of State Bulletin, XLIII (20 Aug 60), 349.

✓ 20 Jul 60

The Western five nations that had participated in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference discontinued at Geneva their post-Conference co-ordination of Western views on the US proposals of 27 June 1960 (see item). (This co-ordination, begun on 29 June, was now discontinued at Geneva with the understanding that it would be continued through diplomatic channels.) By this time Canada, Italy, the UK, and the US had agreed on a revised plan. The French, however, diverging from the other four nations in their views on control and elimination of nuclear weapons and vehicles for the delivery of such weapons, withheld their approval of the revised plan. (See item of 9 August 1960.)

(S) "Report by the Representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense, Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley, U.S. Navy, to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament 1960," 9 Aug 60 (pp. 3-4), App to Encl B to (S) JCS 1731/407, 12 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 15.

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✓ 22 Jul 60

Ambassador Lodge requested the Chairman of the UN Disarmament Commission to reconvene that body in early August 1960, to "consider promptly the situation arising from the Soviet decision to break off . . . negotiations" (see item of 27 June 1960). Ambassador Lodge provided the Chairman with a copy of the US disarmament proposal of 27 June 1960 (see item), for circulation among the members of the Disarmament Commission.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (15 Aug 60), 253.  
NYT, 23 Jul 60, p. 3.

✓ 22 Jul 60

The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 23 April 1960, in which they were asked to provide their views concerning the impact on the US military posture of a reduction in the forces of the US and the USSR to 2.1 million men. The Deputy Secretary had specified that the assumption of proportional reductions in the services be used for

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the study but had requested the JCS to indicate any alternative method of reduction that might in their opinion be preferable.

In their reply the JCS cited their previous memorandums of 12 February, 4 March, and 22 June 1960 and reaffirmed the views expressed therein. In consideration of the Deputy Secretary's request, however, they had made a new estimate of the effects of the postulated reduction. This appraisal showed, in summary, that the reduction would result in a significantly adverse effect on the military capability of the US to support national interests in cold, limited, or general war. [ ]

[ ] The foregoing appraisal had been made assuming proportional reduction of the Services. Because of the variables involved it would be unprofitable to make a study on any other assumption, the JCS said, until such time as Phase I of the arms-control plan had been put into effect.

(S) JCSM-318-60 to SecDef, "Study of Arms Control Measures to Reduce Military Manpower of U.S. and USSR to 2.1 Million Men [ ]", 22 Jul 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 14, derived from (S) JCS 1731/401, 18 Jul 60, ibid.; (S) JCS 1731/373, 26 Apr 60, same file, sec 7.

26 Jul 60

At Geneva the USSR offered to permit international teams to carry out three on-site inspections on its territory annually to investigate possible violations of the projected ban on nuclear weapons tests. Reciprocally, the USSR would be permitted to carry out three inspections on the territory of the US or the UK. (This was the first specific figure advanced by the USSR since its proposal for an annual quota of veto-free inspections, presented in April 1959. For US proposals regarding a fixed-quota system, see item of 13 July 1960.) In his presentation of the offer Soviet Delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin emphasized that the USSR had borrowed the idea of an arbitrarily limited number of inspections from British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (who had suggested it during his visit in Moscow in February 1959). (See items of 23 and 27 April 1959.) Tsarapkin also emphasized that the quota of three inspections would apply to unidentified seismic events both above and below the threshold of magnitude 4.75. He insisted that only a few inspections would be needed because it was to be assumed that all parties to the test-ban treaty would live up to their obligations. The US proposal of 20 inspections annually was unrealistic and unacceptable, he said.

US Delegate James J. Wadsworth immediately characterized the quota proposed by Tsarapkin as grossly inadequate, commenting that such a small number of inspections would hardly deter a prospective violator of any treaty that might be agreed on. Nevertheless,

he said, he welcomed the offer of a specific number of inspections as perhaps signifying a start toward serious negotiation on this issue. The UK delegate voiced a similar reaction.

NYT, 27 Jul 60, pp. 1, 6.

27 Jul 60

At the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference, the three powers agreed on the definition of a "suspicious tremor" as one exceeding 4.75 magnitude.

NYT, 28 Jul 60, p. 2.

1 Aug 60

The US and UK delegates at the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference rejected the Soviet offer of three on-site inspections per year (see item of 26 July 1960) as "too few to be a serious deterrent against a violation of the ban." US delegate Wadsworth contended that three inspections per year would deal with less than 1 per cent of the estimated annual number of unidentifiable seismic disturbances in the USSR.

NYT, 2 Aug 60, p. 3.

1 Aug 60

The USSR, in a letter from its acting UN delegate to the Chairman of the UN Disarmament Commission, stated its objection to the convening of that commission, alleging that the US had requested the resumption of meetings as a maneuver to conceal its unwillingness to reach any agreement. The USSR proposed as an alternative that all heads of government attend the General Assembly's September meeting in order to discuss disarmament.

NYT, 2 Aug 60, p. 2.

2 Aug 60

The USSR formally rejected the US proposal that Western and Soviet nuclear devices be pooled for use in research on underground test detection. (See item of 22 July 1960.)

NYT, 3 Aug 60, pp. 1, 3.

8 Aug 60

The US replied to the Soviet note of 19 July 1960 (see item), terming that note "a deliberate attempt to mislead world opinion by distorting the facts and to divert attention from actions of the Soviet Government which are serving to increase tensions throughout the world." The US blamed the USSR for disruption of the Geneva Disarmament Conference (see item of 27 June 1960) and stated that this disruption raised "serious doubts" concerning the desire of the Soviet Government for meaningful disarmament measures.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (29 Aug 60), 348.

9 Aug 60

Admiral Paul L. Dudley, USN, who had served as the representative of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the Department of Defense at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference, pointed out in his official report on that conference two "problem areas" requiring further attention in the formulation of US policy on disarmament. The first area embraced those problems requiring clarification in order to make possible the development of a comprehensive arms-control policy to supplement the existing arms-control provisions of basic national security policy. Admiral Dudley recommended the development of such a comprehensive arms-control document and its adoption by the National Security Council as national policy. He observed that this would ensure that any subsequent policy changes would be officially approved or noted at the NSC level and communicated to holders of the document.

"Some" of the problems in the first area were the following: (1) The conditions for the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. It was clear that effective verification must be operative before any cutoff went into effect. But whether or not the US would insist that progress be made in conventional disarmament prior to such a cutoff was not clear; nor was it clear what would constitute "progress in conventional disarmament." (2) The

conditions for transfers of fissionable materials from past production to peaceful uses. The point needing clarification here was when and under what conditions the US would be willing to reduce its existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Admiral Dudley recommended that "progress in conventional disarmament" be a prerequisite to such reduction. (3) The undesirable precedent of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Admiral Dudley pointed out that, whatever the outcome of the nuclear-test-ban conference, the Soviets had gained a temporary test ban and moratorium on their own terms, a precedent to be avoided in future disarmament negotiations. (4) The conditions for a reduction in existing armed forces in the context of a disarmament program. The unclear element here was whether states other than the US, the USSR, and Communist China would participate by reducing to force levels appropriate to their sizes if the three states named were to reduce to 2.1 million men each. Admiral Dudley recommended that all other states of the Sino-Soviet bloc participate. (5) The broad categories of armaments to be affected in each stage of a disarmament program. These categories had not been identified, Admiral Dudley pointed out. He stated his belief that the US should develop a position enabling it to say at what points, in relation to reductions in force levels, the US would implement agreed reductions in various categories of armaments. (6) Quantities of atomic, chemical, biological (ABC), and other weapons of mass destruction. NSC policy guidance on ABC weapons comparable to that on nuclear weapons did not exist. Since both the US disarmament plan of 27 June 1960 and the Soviet plan of 7 June 1960 provided for destruction of ABC weapons, national policy should cover this subject. (7) Conditions for negotiation and agreement on measures requiring participation by Red China and other militarily significant states. Under the US proposals of 27 June 1960 the Ten Nations would negotiate, agree on, and ratify an instrument covering not only those Stage I measures not requiring participation of Red China but also those Stage I measures requiring Red Chinese participation; further, those measures not requiring Red Chinese participation would be immediately implemented. Admiral Dudley recommended that negotiation of the Stage I measures requiring Red Chinese participation not start until agreement had been reached on the measures not requiring such participation; that agreement on the measures requiring Red Chinese participation not be reached until verified implementation of the measures not requiring such participation had been initiated; and that implementation of the measures requiring Red Chinese participation not start until verified implementation of the measures not requiring such participation had been completed.

Policy differences with France comprised the second problem area commented on by Admiral Dudley. A fundamental reason for the divergent viewpoint of the French, he said, was their fear that disarmament might initially freeze the French military status quo at a time when it included only small, if any, stocks of nuclear weapons, thus permanently relegating France to a military position inferior to that of the US, the USSR, and the UK. Further, the French did not feel safe from Soviet nuclear blackmail if they had to depend

solely on US strategic nuclear capability (which they feared might not be used), and they were apprehensive that the US might significantly reduce its forces in Europe if its total force levels were reduced through a disarmament process. The following specific policy issues between the US and France might be "papered over" as they had been in the Five-Power Working Paper (see item of 14 March 1960), but they were unlikely to be resolved until France acquired an independent nuclear capability: (1) Control of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles: The French were proposing, as an initial measure and under international control, the separation of nuclear weapons from their strategic delivery vehicles (even though, as Admiral Dudley pointed out, the nuclear element was "an integral part of the weapon" in some cases). (2) Reduction and elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles: The French proposed substantial reduction in the numbers of these vehicles in Stage I and their elimination in Stage II. (3) Reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. The French proposed that any cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons be accompanied by substantial reductions in existing nuclear weapons stocks and the final elimination of these stocks in Stage II or III. (4) Reductions in force levels: The French had been opposed since 1956 to limitations on their force levels, particularly as this might affect reserves called to active duty because of the Algerian situation. Since both Western and Soviet disarmament plans called for force reductions by all militarily significant states, an understanding with the French would have to be reached on this point. (5) European zone of inspection against surprise attack: The French were rejecting any inspection zone in Europe narrower than the one proposed in 1957 (10° W--60° E longitude and north of 40° N latitude--roughly Europe west of the Urals), and even this zone was acceptable to them only with certain extensions. The French feared that agreement on a narrower zone, such as one encompassing only non-Soviet territory in Europe, might be followed by neutralization of the zone, which would require the withdrawal of US forces.

(b) "Report by the Representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense, Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley, U.S. Navy, to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament 1960" (pp. 2, 4-9), App to Encl B to (c) JCS 1731/407, 12 Aug 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 15.

10 Aug 60

The US Senate voted 66 to 21 in favor of ratifying the treaty dedicating the Antarctic Continent to peaceful purposes. The treaty had been signed by 12 nations in Washington on 1 December 1959 (see item). Five nations had ratified before the US Senate acted. To become effective, the treaty would have to be ratified by all 12 signatories. (See item of 21 October 1960.)

NYT, 11 Aug 60, pp. 1, 4.

11 Aug 60

The USSR agreed to the West's 6-year timetable for establishing a nuclear-test-ban inspection system (see item of 12 May 60), subject to the following modifications of the first phase: (1) A reduction of the control



points within USSR from the West's proposed 21 to 15; (2) an increase in the number of world-wide control points from 47 to 68; (3) geographic extension of first-phase controls, from the Northern Hemisphere only, to include those Southern Hemisphere areas where the US and UK had in the past conducted tests.

NYT, 12 Aug 60, pp. 1, 3.

12 Aug 60

The NSC discussed the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing, on the basis of an oral presentation by the Secretary of State and in the light of the policy decision of 24 May 1960 (see item). No change was made in the policy decision.

(25) NSC Action No. 2278, 12 Aug 60 (approved by President 17 Aug 60).

16 Aug 60

In a speech to the UN Disarmament Commission, US Ambassador Lodge reviewed the course of negotiations up to the presentation of the latest US proposals at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva on 27 June 1960 (see item). Taking note of Soviet charges that the US had failed to take a single step to meet the Soviet position at Geneva, Lodge emphasized that the following features of the US proposals of 27 June had been "genuine concessions to Soviet views": (1) the inclusion of a definition of general and complete disarmament, in terms not very different from the Soviet definition; (2) the acceptance of the principle that each measure of a disarmament program would be carried out in an agreed and strictly defined period of time; (3) the adoption of a provision based on the Soviet plan of 2 June 1960 (see item) for a review by the Security Council of the progress of disarmament at the end of each disarmament stage; (4) the agreement to a figure of 1.7 million men for the armed forces of the US and USSR in the second stage of disarmament; (5) the acceptance of a technical examination of measures necessary to control, reduce, and eliminate agreed categories of nuclear delivery systems--measures given first place in the Soviet disarmament program.

Ambassador Lodge urged the resumption of disarmament negotiations. He offered two new proposals as proof of the serious purpose of the US: (1) The US was prepared to agree on a reciprocal basis with the USSR to a cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, accompanied by the transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials from weapons stocks to peaceful uses under international supervision. Specifically, the US now proposed that the US and the Soviet Union each set aside 30,000 kilograms of weapons-grade U-235 as the amount each would initially transfer; (2) if the USSR should not be willing to participate in such a program, the US proposed that the two powers join in halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons use "by successive steps." The US was prepared to shut down, one by one, under international supervision, its major plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium if the Soviet Union would shut down equivalent facilities. The US was prepared to do this "now--with no delay at all."

Soviet Ambassador Vasily V. Kuznetsov rejected both proposals because, he said, the transfer of materials and the closing of production facilities would still leave "weapons of fearful power."

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (5 Sep 60), 376-382;  
NYT, 17 Aug 60, pp. 1, 4.

- 18 Aug 60 The UN Disarmament Commission unanimously approved a resolution recommending that the General Assembly "give earnest consideration to the question of disarmament" and that "continued efforts be made for the earliest possible continuation of international negotiations to achieve a constructive solution to the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control." (The resolution could be read as a call for resumption of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference, which had held its last meeting on 28 July 1960, following the walkout of the five Communist-bloc delegations on 27 July.)  
NYT, 19 Aug 60, p. 3.
- 22 Aug 60 The Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference recessed until 27 September 1960.  
NYT, 23 Aug 60, pp. 1, 3.
- 26 Aug 60 In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense the JCS urgently recommended that US nuclear testing be resumed. They emphasized the possibility that the USSR might be conducting clandestine tests during the uninspected moratorium on testing; hence the relative nuclear capability of the US versus the USSR might be adversely affected unless the US could test the performance of new nuclear designs.

*WJ (11/15)*

The Acting Secretary of Defense replied on 15 September 1960. He agreed that there was danger of prejudice to the US position in an extended period of nontesting without effective inspection, but he noted that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had under way a broad reconsideration of the US position in the nuclear-test-ban negotiations. Upon completion of this study the Acting Secretary expected to make specific and comprehensive recommendations to the other US officials involved in formulating nuclear-testing policy, and to the President; and in this regard the JCS memorandum would receive full consideration. (See item of 21 November 1960.)

~~(TS RD)~~ JCSM-374-60 to SecDef, "Requirement for Nuclear Testing (U)," 26 Aug 60, derived from ~~(TS RD)~~ JCS 2179/221, 15 Aug 60; ~~(TS)~~ N/H of JCS 2179/221, dated 19 Sep 60. All in JMF 4613 (28 Apr 60).

9 Sep 60

The Department of State announced the establishment of the US Disarmament Administration, charged with the development and co-ordination of US policies and activities in the field of arms limitation and control. The result of a study initiated by the Secretary of State in the fall of 1958 at the request of the President, the Disarmament Administration was responsible to the Secretary of State but would draw its staff not only from his department but also from other Government agencies and from outside the Government, marshaling in a single unit political, military, scientific, and technical skills. The acting director of the Disarmament Administration was Edmund A. Gullion, a foreign service officer.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (26 Sep 60), 481; NYT, 10 Sep 60, p. 6; Washington Post and Times Herald, 10 Sep 60, p. A7.

15 Sep 60

General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the JCS, advised President Eisenhower that the State Department draft of a speech to be given by the President on 22 September 1960 at the UN should be revised to accord with the 27 June 1960 disarmament proposals tabled by the US at Geneva. The 27 June 1960 proposals, the general said, should be restated--not renounced, as they seemed to be by implication in the draft of the speech. The 27 June proposals had been fully co-ordinated with the government, General Twining continued, whereas those in the draft speech had not. The latter proposals represented a drastic departure from the concept of balanced and phased arms-control measures under effective international control and inspection at all times, and they were contrary to US basic national security policy. Examples of unsoundness in the speech draft that should be remedied were the following: (1) Advocacy of the reduction of nuclear military capabilities without requiring substantial conventional disarmament, which, if carried out, would impair US nuclear capabilities while leaving Sino-Soviet conventional capabilities unimpaired. (2) A proposal asking the UN to "call on nations to engage in no military activities" on celestial bodies. This would be an uncontrolled ban, probably binding on the US but not on the USSR. Also, it might lead to other UN resolutions designed to ban the bomb, liquidate overseas bases, and eliminate means for delivering nuclear weapons. (3) A proposal asking that an "urgent study be initiated" in connection with control of nuclear delivery systems. Presented outside the context of the 27 June 1960 proposals, it would unduly emphasize this aspect of the program, thus seeming to lean toward the Soviet desire to place the control of nuclear delivery means in Stage I. (4) Proposals concerning nuclear weapons, which, aside from their undesirability because of their not being tied to conventional disarmament, invited the 90-odd nuclear have-not nations to negotiate and pass resolutions on arms controls for US nuclear weapons while themselves having no responsibility for preserving the security of the free world. In addition, the proposal to close nuclear production plants one by one was undesirable because it was offered without requiring verification that new plants were not being established on the territory of the Sino-Soviet bloc. (5) A proposal to terminate nuclear production rather than production of fissionable materials.

The term nuclear would include tritium, without which many "existing or remaining" US nuclear weapons would quickly become ineffective. (6) Failure to specify that nuclear and nonnuclear arms controls must be balanced and that "general disarmament" must be under effective international control.

(e) Memo, CJCS to Pres Eisenhower, "Arms Control Proposals and Your Speech at the United Nations, 22 September 1960," 15 Sep 60, OCJCS file "388.3 (Disarmament)."

22 Sep 60

In a speech to the UN General Assembly, President Eisenhower made proposals designed to (1) prevent the militarization of outer space, (2) prevent war by miscalculation, and (3) halt the growth and preclude the prospective spread of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

In regard to outer space the President proposed that the nations of the world agree (1) that celestial bodies were not subject to national appropriation by any claims of sovereignty; (2) that no warlike activities should take place on these bodies; (3) that, subject to appropriate verification, including advance UN verification of the nature of all spacecraft launchings, the nations would refrain from putting into orbit or stationing in outer space weapons of mass destruction; and (4) that the nations would press forward with a program of international co-operation for constructive peaceful uses of outer space under the UN-- such uses as better weather forecasting, improved world-wide communications, and more effective exploration of the earth itself as well as of outer space.

The President regarded the other two questions-- that of war by miscalculation and that of the mounting nuclear stockpiles and their spread if not forestalled-- as "two pressing dangers" that could be dealt with if the disarmament negotiations broken off on 27 June (see item) were resumed. Calling for resumption of those negotiations, he made the following proposals as ways of guarding against the two dangers:

(1) Any nation seeking to prove its peaceful intention could request the intervention of an appropriate UN surveillance body. The question of methods, the President said, could be left to the experts. The US was prepared to submit to any international inspection provided only that it was truly effective and reciprocal.

(2) Nations producing nuclear weapons should immediately convene experts to design a system for terminating, under verification procedures, all production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The actual termination of production would take effect as soon as the agreed inspection system had been installed and was operating effectively. In the event of such a termination of production, the US was prepared to join the USSR in transferring "substantial" quantities--"not pounds, . . . but tons"--of fissionable materials to international stockpiles. Further, a cessation of production would make possible the closing of some production facilities without delay; the US would be willing to match the USSR in shutting down major plants producing fissionable materials, one by one, under international inspection and verification. Finally, the proposed group of experts could also

consider how to verify the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. There was as yet, the President noted, no known means of carrying out such verification. Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (10 Oct 60), 554-556; NYT, 23 Sep 60, pp. 1, 14.

23 Sep 60

In a lengthy speech to the UN General Assembly, Premier Khrushchev, noting UN approval of Soviet disarmament proposals (see item of 20 November 1959) and Soviet unilateral troop reduction (see item of 14 January 1960), attributed the lack of progress towards disarmament to the US attitude. Mr. Khrushchev stated that the Western disarmament proposals provided for neither general nor complete disarmament, but for controls without disarmament. Thus, according to the Soviet Premier, the USSR had been forced to interrupt the proceedings of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference (see item of 27 June 1960). Mr. Khrushchev proposed to the UN a "new" Soviet plan--which, however, he himself stated had "as its basis the provisions of the Soviet Government's proposals of June 2, 1960" (see item).

NYT, 24 Sep 60, p. 1 (text of speech on pp. 6-9).

24 Sep 60

Premier Khrushchev, in a press interview at Glen Cove, New York, declared that the problem of disarmament could not be solved unless the problem of the UN Secretariat-General was cleared up first. Mr. Khrushchev stated that the USSR would not consider approving any international force to operate in the postdisarmament period if it was to be under the control of the current Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold.

NYT, 25 Sep 60, p. 1.

27 Sep 60

At the resumption of the Geneva nuclear-test-ban negotiations, after a 5-week recess, the US proposed that the previously discussed moratorium (see below), applying to underground nuclear tests below magnitude 4.75 and going into effect upon the signing of a treaty, should be limited to a duration of 27 months. (The Soviets had previously proposed 4 or 5 years; see item of 21 March 1960.) This was to be the period of time allowed for completion of a joint US-UK-USSR research program into ways of improving detection of tests not banned by the treaty but covered by the moratorium. The mention of a time limit was the only element added to the moratorium as it had first been proposed in the Eisenhower-Macmillan statement of 29 March 1960 (see item). The moratorium remained subject to the two basic conditions originally specified by the two Western Heads of Government: (1) The three powers at Geneva must settle all outstanding issues in the nuclear-test-ban talks and sign a treaty banning monitorable tests (as proposed by the US on 11 February 1960; see item), and (2) arrangements must be agreed on for the co-ordinated seismic-research program mentioned above. The suggested time limit on the moratorium was put forward, US Acting Delegate Charles C. Stelle said, in an effort to speed up the negotiations. He warned the Soviet Union that the US would go ahead with a unilateral program of seismic research (Project VELA; see item of 7 May 1960) if the Soviet Union did not agree soon to a co-ordinated research program.

NYT, 28 Sep 60, p. 18.

27 Sep 60

The USSR proposed, in a letter signed by Nikita Khrushchev and circulated in the UN General Assembly, that five new nations--India, Indonesia, Ghana, Mexico, and the United Arab Republic--be added to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee. This was the first formal move of the USSR to reactivate the Committee since the walkout of the Communist delegations at Geneva on 27 June.

A statement issued by the US delegation commented that the disarmament problem did not lie primarily in the structure of the negotiating body; it was a question of the willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate an equitable and reliable agreement. The statement listed the series of bodies that had already attempted to deal with the problem--"commissions for conventional and atomic disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission (which the U.S.S.R. boycotted in 1957), an enlarged 25-member Disarmament Commission (in which the U.S.S.R. refused to participate), an 82-member Disarmament Commission (which the U.S.S.R. threatened to boycott this summer), and the 10-member committee (which the U.S.S.R. walked out of in June . . . ." The last-mentioned body, the statement pointed out, had been proposed by the USSR itself.

A Western spokesman made a further point. The new Soviet proposal posed fundamental difficulties, for it asked the Assembly to expand a body not created by the Assembly. The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee had grown out of a private agreement between the Big Four in the late summer of 1959 (see item of 10 September 1959) to make a fresh start on disarmament negotiations with a body outside the UN but reporting to it.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (17 Oct 60), 620-621; NYT, 28 Sep 60, pp. 1, 18.

28 Sep 60

The International Atomic Energy Agency, which had begun its fourth annual conference at Vienna on 20 September 1960, adopted a US-sponsored resolution providing a system of inspection of fissionable material and related equipment delivered to the less-developed countries for peaceful uses. The system would be designed to prevent the diversion of these materials and equipment to military purposes. The Soviet delegation had assailed the proposed plan as a scheme to preserve and fortify US domination of small and backward countries, but the resolution passed by a vote of 44 to 14.

NYT, 21 Sep 60, pp. 1, 3; ibid., 23 Sep 60, p. 16; ibid., 29 Sep 60, p. 14.

9 Oct 60 John F. Kennedy, the Democratic Presidential nominee, stated in a letter to Thomas E. Murray, former AEC member, that he did not believe underground nuclear testing should be resumed "at this time" or before "all reasonable opportunities" for a test-ban treaty had been exhausted. Mr. Kennedy added to these views a listing of the proposed policies of his administration, should he be elected, as follows: (1) The US would not be the first to resume tests in the atmosphere. (2) If the Geneva nuclear-test-ban negotiations were still in progress, the US would pursue the negotiations with vigor. (3) If the Geneva conference had terminated, the US would immediately ask the USSR, the UK, and France to resume negotiations. (4) In the case of either (2) or (3) above, the US would prescribe a "reasonable" time limit to determine if there was significant progress. (5) The US would invite leading nations having the industrial capacity for production of nuclear weapons to agree on international control of the production and use of nuclear material rich enough for weapons, and also on the production of nuclear weapons. (6) The US would seek an over-all disarmament agreement in which limitations on nuclear weapons tests, weapons-grade fissionable materials, and biological and chemical warfare agents would be integral parts.

NYT, 10 Oct 60, pp. 1, 19 (text of letter on p. 19).

11 Oct 60 The UN General Assembly rejected the Soviet demand that the General Assembly take up the disarmament question itself instead of referring it to Committee I (Political and Security). The vote was 54 to 13 (the Communist bloc, Afghanistan, Guinea, Mali, and Cuba), with 31 abstentions.

NYT, 12 Oct 60, pp. 1, 16.

11 Oct 60 New York Times correspondent James W. Finney reported from Washington that the US was concerned lest recent developments of the "centrifuge" process of producing fissionable materials, a far less costly method than the gaseous-diffusion methods already in use, might speed the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Mr. Finney reported that the US had asked the Netherlands and Western Germany to keep secret the recent centrifuge developments of their industries.

NYT, 12 Oct 60, pp. 1, 10.

14 Oct 60 A tripartite draft resolution calling for the early resumption of disarmament negotiations was submitted to the UN General Assembly by the US, UK, and Italy. The resolution offered the following as the goals of a general and complete disarmament program: (1) Reduction of all national armed forces and armaments to levels required for internal security and for the provision of agreed contingents to an international peace force within the United Nations; (2) elimination of the means of delivery of all weapons of mass destruction; (3) elimination of all weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological; (4) the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only; (5) the establishment of effective means for verification of the observance of disarmament obligations; (6) the achievement of a secure, free, and open world.

The resolution also offered the following as principles to guide disarmament negotiations: (1) Disarmament should be carried out progressively;

(2) transition from one stage to the next should be initiated when the measures in the preceding stage had been satisfactorily implemented, provided that effective verification was continuing and that additional verification arrangements agreed to for the next stage were ready to operate effectively; (3) nuclear and conventional measures of disarmament must be balanced so that no country or group of countries would obtain, at any stage, a significant military advantage; (4) compliance with all disarmament obligations must be effectively verified throughout by an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations; (5) provisions regarding international control and verification should form an integral part of any agreement on disarmament; (6) general and complete disarmament must start with those measures capable of early implementation under effective international control and compatible with the principle of balanced disarmament.

NYT, 15 Oct 60, p. 3.

19 Oct 60 At the opening of Committee I (Political and Security) deliberations upon disarmament, Soviet UN Delegate Zorin termed Western disarmament proposals "futile" and threatened a Soviet boycott of the UN disarmament discussions if these proposals were considered by the committee.

NYT, 20 Oct 60, p. 1.

19 Oct 60 In a lengthy address before Committee I (Political and Security) at the UN, US Ambassador Wadsworth reviewed the more important measures that the US believed could be carried out in the first stage of any disarmament process. In regard to nuclear disarmament, Wadsworth reiterated the US proposal that the US and USSR cease all production of fissionable materials for use in weapons and transfer 30,000 kilograms of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium from weapons stockpiles to peaceful purposes. (See item of 16 August 1960.) Wadsworth stated that the US was prepared to undertake this "major disarmament step" without making it contingent upon any other disarmament proposals. Should the USSR be unwilling to accept such a complete shutdown of its nuclear production centers, however, the US was prepared alternatively to close its plants "one by one, under international control, on a reciprocal basis. . . . now-- with no delay."

After stating that "one of the most important and challenging opportunities the world has before it is to prevent the development of outer space for military uses," Wadsworth reiterated President Eisenhower's proposals to this end (see item 22 September 1950). Finally, Ambassador Wadsworth reviewed the measures the US had proposed to reduce the dangers of surprise attack and the US stand on phased reduction of military manpower.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII, 14 Nov 60, 766-769.

21 Oct 60 The treaty dedicating the Antarctic Continent to peaceful purposes (see items of 1 December 1959 and 10 August 1960) was ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, according to a Reuters report of an announcement by the Soviet news agency Tass. (This apparently left 5 of the 12 ratifications to be completed before the treaty could go into effect.)

NYT, 22 Oct 60, p. 5.



27 Oct 60 - Speaking before Committee I (Political and Security) at the UN, Ambassador Wadsworth emphasized the devotion of the US to the purpose of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control and the US willingness to resume active negotiations toward that goal. Continuing, he said, "In my personal opinion, if we were to start now and work at good speed, the step-by-step process to this goal should be completed in the neighborhood of, say, 5 to 6 years, and with good faith and a real sense of urgency on both sides, it could take even less."

Wadsworth's address was in reply to a recent speech by Soviet representative Zorin, who had asserted that the US and other Western nations were evading general and complete disarmament and were interested in controls only for the purpose of creating a system of international espionage. Wadsworth attacked particularly the validity of Zorin's statement that the Soviet Union was ready to accept any and all controls that were necessary. The US representative sought to demonstrate that every control proposal so far offered by the Soviet Union had involved either a large measure of self-inspection or some other arrangement that depended solely on the good faith of the parties in vital respects.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (28 Nov 60), 836-841; NYT, 28 Oct 60, p. 2.

28 Oct 60 The JCS, on their own initiative, wrote to the Secretary of Defense to object to certain statements on disarmament made by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth before Committee I at the UN (see item of 19 October 1960). These statements, the JCS said, were "clearly contrary to" and "clearly incompatible with" the US arms-control proposal of 27 June 1960. The latter, they pointed out continued to be the latest arms-control proposal fully co-ordinated within the US Government and approved by the President. The objectionable statements were the following: (1) The US was willing "to stop producing fissionable materials for weapons use entirely, and to remove from its weapons stockpile explosives with a destructive force of over 1,000 times that of all the high explosive bombs used by all the Powers during all of World War II," and further, the US was "prepared to undertake this major disarmament now without making it contingent on any other disarmament proposals." (2) The US was "also prepared to shut our plants down one-by-one, under international inspection, on a reciprocal basis . . . now, with no delay." (3) "One of the most important and challenging opportunities the world has before it is to prevent the development of outer space for military uses."

In opposition to these statements the JCS said that they held the following beliefs: (1) The US should continue to tie together the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, the transfer of fissionable materials to nonweapons uses, and the reduction of existing nuclear-weapons stockpiles and should continue to condition all these measures on satisfactory progress in conventional disarmament by the Sino-Soviet bloc. (2) The US should reject the closing of plants one by one unless there were verification that new plants were not being established elsewhere within Sino-Soviet territory. (3) The US, though advo-

cating a ban on placing in orbit or stationing in outer space weapons capable of mass destruction, should reject a blanket ban on "military uses" of outer space; otherwise, the measure might be interpreted to preclude the use of satellites for purposes like weather information and communications or to guard against surprise missile attack. (4) The 27 June 1960 program should continue to be the basis for proposals in the arms-control field until such time as it might be superseded by a revision duly approved by the NSC.

The JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense call to the attention of the Secretary of State the above-mentioned objections to Mr. Wadsworth's UN speech and request the Secretary of State to ensure that all proposals concerning arms control made by persons under his jurisdiction conform to the arms-control paper of 27 June 1960 unless changes in that paper were co-ordinated with the Department of Defense, including the JCS, and approved by the President.

On 26 November 1960 the Secretary of Defense incorporated the JCS objections, comments, and recommendations into a letter to the Secretary of State. In addition to the objectionable statements mentioned by the JCS, the Secretary cited one made by Mr. Wadsworth on 27 October 1960 (see item) in which the Ambassador had given his personal opinion that under optimum conditions the goal of general and complete disarmament could be reached in about 5 or 6 years. It had been US policy, the Secretary of Defense observed, "to expressly avoid" any suggestion of an over-all time period for the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament. (See item of 9 December 1960.)

(S) JCSM-487-60 to SecDef, "Statement by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, United Nations Committee One, on Disarmament, 19 October 1960," 28 Oct 60, derived from (S) JCS 1731/415, 25 Oct 60; (S) 1st N/H of JCS 1731/415, 30 Nov 60. All in JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 18.

28 Oct 60

In response to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 14 July 1960, as modified orally on 23 September 1960, the JCS forwarded the following to the Secretary of Defense: (1) a recommended "U.S. Policy on Arms Control"; (2) a recommended "U.S. Position for Arms Control Negotiations"; and (3) an interpretive guide to policy for use with the US arms-control plan of 27 June 1960, as revised.

The recommended "U.S. Policy on Arms Control," stressing that the US must maintain a position of strength from which to negotiate with the USSR, drew heavily on the proposed statement of policy submitted by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on 12 February 1960 (see item); indeed, though there were various changes, the policy remained essentially the same. One of the changes was the inclusion of a definition of "arms control." This phrase was equated with the word "disarmament" as a term denoting "numerical limitation, reduction, inspection and verification, by international agreement, of armed forces and armaments." Two of the more notable of the other changes were (1) the inclusion of a requirement that disarmament policy be reviewed at least once a year, and (2) the inclusion of a requirement that any arms-control agreement with members of the Sino-Soviet bloc contain a provision for relief of the

US in the event of (a) violation of the agreement by another party, or (b) technological advances that would adversely affect the security of the US and the free world if the US continued to adhere to the agreement.

In the "U.S. Position for Arms Control Negotiations" the JCS followed rather closely the US position set forth in the 27 June proposals at Geneva (see item). But here again there were changes of significance. The principal changes were the following: (1) On withdrawal from an arms-control agreement: After repeating the language of the "Guiding Principles" of the 27 June proposals stating that no nation should suffer a disadvantage as a result of the disarmament process, the JCS position paper added an interpretive comment.

(2) On the time allowed for carrying out an agreement: The JCS paper added a proviso to that language of the 27 June "Guiding Principles" requiring each measure to be carried out in an "agreed and strictly defined" period of time. The proviso stated that no precise time period should be specified in advance for a stage as a whole or for the entire program. (3) On force levels: The JCS paper required the term "force levels" to be defined before any attempt should be made to carry out any agreement limiting force levels. Moreover, the term "other militarily significant states," also left undefined in this context by the 27 June proposals, should be interpreted to include, in addition to the other states with existing or potentially significant military capabilities, the entire Sino-Soviet bloc. (4) On fissionable materials: The term "fissionable materials" was defined in the JCS paper in language explicitly excluding tritium and deuterium. Cessation of the production of such materials for use in weapons was to be contingent upon verification that force levels had been reduced to 2.1 million and that the other measures in the same stage of disarmament had been carried out. The initial quantity of fissionable materials to be transferred to international control should leave undiminished the stocks of US nuclear weapons in existence. Any subsequent transfers that would reduce the stocks of such weapons should await verification that force levels had been reduced to 1.7 million and that the other measures of that stage of disarmament had been carried out.

The interpretive guide to policy for use with the US arms-control plan of 27 June 1960, as revised, gave a running commentary, in the light of the foregoing policy and negotiating-position papers, on the various provisions of that plan.

The JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense obtain approval of the first two documents by the five principal advisers to the President on arms-control

matters, and by the National Security Council. The JCS recommended further that the Secretary of Defense approve the third item--the interpretive guide to policy --for use within the Department of Defense, particularly by military representatives on interdepartmental working groups and at international conferences.

On 19 November 1960 the Secretary of Defense forwarded the above-mentioned policy and position drafts to the Secretary of State, noting that he was also sending a copy to each of the other disarmament principals. He stated that he had reviewed the documents submitted by the JCS and considered them suitable for adoption. He noted that the position recommended for arms-control negotiations was consistent with the 27 June 1960 proposal submitted by the US to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference. As for arms-control policy, he thought it desirable that such policy should be set forth in a single NSC document, to which the current arms-control position could be appended, with both documents periodically revised to keep them current.

On 30 November 1960 the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs commented to the Secretary of State concerning the foregoing, stating that he "heartily" endorsed the Defense Secretary's recommendation that arms-control policy be codified in a single document.

The Secretary of State replied to the Secretary of Defense on 8 December 1960, stating that he thought it would be useful to have a codification of the existing US position on disarmament in a single document but did not believe such a document should attempt to incorporate the results of a new examination of disarmament policy; the next administration might wish to conduct such a review, he pointed out. Accordingly, he was referring the policy and position documents to the United States Disarmament Administration (see item of 9 September 1960) for examination.

On 10 December the director of Central Intelligence responded by stating in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense his readiness to participate in interagency consideration of arms-control policy.

(JCS records do not show, as of 6 March 1961, a response from the fifth disarmament principal, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.)

(S) JCSM-483-60 to SecDef, "U.S. Policy on Arms Control (U)," 28 Oct 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 18, derived from (S) JCS 1731/414, 19 Oct 60, same file, sec 17; (S) 1st, 2d 3d, and 4th N/H's to JCS 1731/414, 23 Nov, 6 Dec, 19 Dec, and 20 Dec 60, ibid.; (S) JCS 1731/402, 18 Jul 60, same file, sec 14.

21 Nov 60

The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that they had not sufficiently emphasized in their memorandum of 26 August 1960 (see item) how time was working to the disadvantage of the US while the nuclear-testing moratorium was in effect. The JCS considered that the length of time before any inspection system could be implemented had placed the US in what amounted to a unilateral test cessation of unacceptable duration.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) replied to the foregoing by memorandum to the Chairman of the JCS on 15 December 1960. The Secretary of Defense, the reply stated, had decided that it was not appropriate "at this time" to approach the President on the subject of the nuclear-test moratorium.

(S) JCSM-528-60 to SecDef, "Nuclear Test Moratorium (U)," 21 Nov 60, derived from (S) JCS 2179/228, 8 Nov 60; (S) 1st N/H of JCS 2179/228, dated 20 Dec 60. All in JMF 4613 (28 Apr 60).

24 Nov 60

The USSR proposed at the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference that inspections not be initiated, after the signing of a treaty, until all control posts were in place. The USSR estimated that 4 years would be required to install the control posts.

NYT, 25 Nov 60, p.3.

29 Nov 60

In an address to Committee I (Political and Security) at the UN, Ambassador Wadsworth summarized the progress of the Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference toward resolution of the three outstanding unresolved issues: control-system capability, on-site inspections, and control-organization staffing.

Ambassador Wadsworth noted that the USSR had agreed in principle earlier in the year to the establishment of a research program for improving the performance of control systems. The Ambassador then reviewed the curious development whereby the Soviet scientists' announcement of a Soviet research program to this end was repudiated by the Soviet political delegation (see item of 2 June 1960). Since that time, Wadsworth continued, the USSR had agreed to a research program, "but only if, first, none of it takes place on Soviet territory; secondly, no Soviet nuclear devices are used; thirdly, Soviet scientists are given complete blueprints of any United States or United Kingdom nuclear devices used; and, fourthly, that Soviet scientists participate fully in setting up the necessary instrumentation, are given full access to all resulting data, and participate fully in analyzing and drawing conclusions from the data."

In the matter of on-site inspections, Wadsworth contrasted the desire of the US and UK for a "treaty organization whose capabilities are objectively assured on the basis of scientific facts" with the Soviet desire for a "treaty whose capabilities are limited by purely subjective political considerations." The Soviet proposal for three on-site inspections annually (see item of 26 July 1960) would permit, according to Wadsworth, inspection of "far less than 1 out of every 100 suspicious disturbances in a normal year." In

addition, Wadsworth scored the Soviet proposal that inspections be delayed for four years, until all the control posts were fully installed (see item of 24 November 1960). Finally, Wadsworth asserted that Soviet fears of espionage connected with an adequate inspection arrangement were unfounded, since there were treaty provisions--already agreed to by the USSR--that allowed observers from the host country who could prevent the inspection personnel from exceeding their agreed functions.

Wadsworth then commented upon the differences of opinion concerning the staffing and structure of the international control organization envisioned by the treaty. Whereas the USSR did not believe that the operation of the treaty organization could be entrusted to an international force of technical experts and therefore insisted upon retention of control by the three nuclear powers, the US and UK placed their faith in the international community. Wadsworth continued that although the USSR had assented to the participation of other nations, it had qualified this assent by proposing a rigid system of appointment of the entire staff of the organization by the three nuclear powers, had desired to so limit the authority of the neutral administrator that "countless problems would have to be settled by bargaining among the nuclear powers themselves," and had wished to allow only one uncommitted country to be included among the nations represented on the 7-man control commission. Wadsworth contrasted to these Soviet positions the positions of the US and UK: expanded membership for uncommitted states on the control commission, participation of nationals of other countries in all areas of the control organization, discretion--within certain basic limits--for the neutral chief executive to select a staff. Wadsworth concluded that, although the US had welcomed the USSR's abandonment of initial positions that called for "virtually complete self-inspection as well as authority to exercise veto power over all but the smallest issues of procedure," the US considered that the position of the Soviet Union "even now would permit the country being controlled to have the decisive voice over inspection and control in its own territory."

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIII (19 Dec 60), 930-936; NYT, 30 Nov 60, p. 21.

- 5 Dec 60 The Geneva nuclear-test-ban conference, adjourned until the new year. (Although 7 February 1961 was mentioned as the prospective meeting date, the conference did not actually reconvene until 21 March 1961.)  
NYT, 6 Dec 60, p. 1; ibid., 22 Mar 60, p. 1.
- 6 Dec 60 The JCS replied to a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 19 September 1960, in which they had been requested to extend their previous communications study (see item of 1 July 1960) to consider the suggestions of interested agencies. Under the extended terms of reference the JCS made the following points in addition to those made in their earlier study: (1) Because of the distances involved in a world-wide communications system, the use of aircraft and pouches as a primary means of communication would be ruled out; however, a diplomatic-type courier system would be required to forward duplicate copies of all transmitted messages for comparison in order to demonstrate the integrity of the communications system. (2) With the kind of communications system envisioned, an authentication system using test elements and authenticators as appendages to messages would not guarantee the integrity of message text. The system required a device or technique that would preclude the substitution of messages or of characters within messages. A deterrent against deliberate interference with the system by the host nation might be found in a treaty provision that unaccounted-for irregularities could serve in themselves as grounds for unimpeded inspection of the communications channels or of the seismic area affected by specific communications failures, such inspection to be irrespective of any quota for the inspection of seismic events. (3) In the USSR it was probable that communications facilities in the more populated areas west of the Ural Mountains and in southern Russia would be adequate to support the control organization with a minimum of primary construction; but the area east of the Urals, Siberia, and the Soviet Far East would afford only minimum facilities for control-organization use, and construction, including power plants, buildings, and other facilities, would be required at all control posts except for installations near the larger cities. (4) Information on communications facilities in Communist China was largely confined to that available in 1947-1948, but indications were that very few already-existing facilities would be available for control-organization purposes outside the major cities and coastal area. Here and in other underdeveloped areas careful planning from the beginning would be necessary to provide suitable facilities, including backup facilities and alternate channels. In places like Africa, South America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, where communications facilities adequate to meet the needs of the control organization would require complete construction of voice and teletype facilities, use of these facilities solely for the control organization would be a wasteful use of the frequency spectrum. Additional initial costs would provide multiple-channel systems with considerable capacity in excess of control-organization needs, and the JCS suggested that host nations in these areas might be willing to help finance construction in return

for use of the channels in excess of control-organization needs. (5) In the US, privately owned communications channels needed to support control-organization establishments were readily available for lease. The necessary authority to establish required facilities could be given the control organization by the public law proclaiming ratification of the test-ban treaty, just as Public Law 357 had given the UN its authority to establish communications facilities in its US headquarters. (6) No limitations on personnel for the communications system should be accepted in the draft treaty until the final detection system and its configuration had been agreed upon. (7) The number of locations required for communications could not be estimated until the final locations for control posts had been agreed upon.

On 27 December 1960 the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded the above-described supplemental communications study to the Acting Deputy Director, US Disarmament Administration, Department of State, suggesting that it be discussed at the inter-departmental level in the near future.

(S) JCSM-541-60 to SecDef, "A Communications System for the Proposed Control Organization to Administer the Proposed Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (U)," 6 Dec 60, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 18-A, derived from (S) JCS 2179/229, 21 Nov 60, ibid.; (C) 1st N/H of JCS 2179/229, 30 Dec 60, ibid.; (S) JCS 2179/224, 20 Sep 60, same file, sec 16.

9 Dec 60

On 9 December 1960 the Secretary of State replied to the Secretary of Defense's letter of 26 November objecting to certain statements made by Ambassador Wadsworth at the UN concerning disarmament (see item of 28 October 1960). The Secretary of State agreed that all changes in US arms-control policy should be co-ordinated with the responsible agencies and approved by the President. But the Secretary of State had concluded, after review, that the statements of Ambassador Wadsworth objected to by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS were, except for the one qualified as the Ambassador's personal opinion, in accord with US policy.

In regard to the cutoff of production of fissionable materials, the Secretary of State said he had outlined the central position occupied by this proposal in US disarmament policy during recent years in a letter to the Secretary of Defense on 1 February 1960 (not on file in Joint Secretariat). The importance of this element of arms-control policy had been reaffirmed by the President during the discussions within the government preceding the Ten-Nation Conference (see item of 18 February 1960), at which time the President had made clear that the cutoff was a separable first-step proposal, and this position had been reaffirmed in the President's speech of 22 September 1960 (see item). The language in the Five-Power Working Plan of 14 March 1960 (see item) linking the cutoff with progressive conventional disarmament was proposed by the UK, the Secretary said, and had only been acceded to by the US for the sake of obtaining agreement on the paper; at the same time the US position had been made clear as not requiring the cutoff to be dependent upon agreement in the conventional field.



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there remained only a few questions to be resolved before agreement on controlled suspension of nuclear weapons tests could be concluded. The US Representatives reviewed the unsettled questions, stressing that they were not mere side issues susceptible of easy compromise but questions of a fundamental nature affecting the security interests of all countries. Regarding the final resolution, the US stated its concern that indefinite extension of the voluntary suspension of nuclear testing might come to be regarded as an acceptable alternative to the achievement of a safeguarded agreement. Given Soviet secrecy, the US was not prepared to accept indefinite, self-imposed restraints that it had no way of knowing were not being systematically violated.

Dept of State Bulletin, XLIV (16 Jan 61), 94-95;  
NYT, 20 Dec 60, p. 13.

24 Dec 60

In announcing the selection of Paul H. Nitze to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in his administration, President-elect Kennedy said that he wanted the US to do considerably more in the field of disarmament than it had been doing and that Mr. Nitze would play a key role in the development of new disarmament plans.

NYT, 25 Dec 60, pp. 1, 18.